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DETENTION FOR INVESTIGATION BY THE POLICE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRACTICES
WAYNE R. LAFAVE*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial areas in current criminal justice
administration concerns the detention of suspects by the police for
purposes of investigation. In part, the dispute has been over when the
police should be able to take custody in the first instance. Although
this essentially involves the never-ending inquiry into what kind and
quantity of evidence is sufficient to satisfy the "reasonable grounds"
test for arrest, much attention has been given to the issue of whether
custody should ever be allowed upon grounds insufficient for arrest.
This latter question is usually discussed in terms of the provisions
found in the Uniform Arrest Act. Although first proposed in the year
1942 and subsequently adopted by only three states, the debate over
the desirability and constitutionality of such an enactment continues
to this day."
Even more controversy has surrounded the related issue of whether,
after a legitimate taking of custody, the police should be allowed to
continue to hold the arrestee while additional evidence against him is
sought. The focal point of this aspect of the dispute has been the
celebrated case of Mallory v. United States.2 While much of the atten-
tion given to Mallory has been directed toward the Court's use of an
exclusionary-rule type sanction, 3 the importance of the case lies in the
* B.S., 1957, LL.B., 1959, Univ. of Wisconsin; Knapp Fellow, Univ. of Wiscon-
sin, 1959-60; Ass't Prof. of Law, Villanova Univ., 1960-61; Ass't Prof. of Law,
Univ. of Illinois, 1961-.
I am indebted to Mr. Edward J. Kionka, a student at the Illinois College of Law,
and Mr. Allan J. Joseph, a student at the Wisconsin Law School, for research into
cases and statutes on detention after arrest and on field interrogation, respectively.
This article is a by-product of my participation in the analysis phase of the
American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in
the United States. I am also indebted to project director Frank Remington and
the other participants in the project for helpful suggestions.
1. See Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of
Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 402 (1960); Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in
a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 395 (1960).
2. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
3. See Admission of Evidence (Mallory Rule), Hearings on H.R. 11477, S. 2970,
S. 8325 & S. 8855 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearings # 2]; Confessions
and Police Detention, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 234 Before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
declaration that Rule 5 (a)4 contemplates "a procedure that allows
arresting officers little more leeway than the interval between arrest
and the ordinary administrative steps required to bring a suspect be-
fore the nearest available magistrate."'
Of course, it is clear that Mallory is not controlling over state crimi-
nal justice systems.6 This means that the Supreme Court will not in-
validate a confession solely because it was received during a period
of detention which, if authorized by federal officers, would be in viola-
tion of Rule 5(a). However, many would argue not only that the
Court's no-detention norm is appropriate for federal law enforcement
officers, but that it is a proper declaration of the rule which should be
followed by the police at every level of government.
Indeed, it is sometimes erroneously assumed that the law of all the
states is in accordance with the Mallory detention norm.7 Nothing
could be farther from the truth. Not only do the statutes of some
states expressly provide for a period of detention prior to initial
appearance, but the courts in other states have held such detentions,
under certain circumstances, to be proper.
The relevant statutes are those which state how promptly a police
officer must bring an arrestee before the magistrate after arrest with-
out warrant. 8 Fourteen states have failed to enact any such general
provision,9 although many of them have adopted statutes pertaining to
limited situations.10 Of the remaining states, the most predominant
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearings # 1]. The Court first applied this type
sanction in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
4. The reference is to FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(a), which requires federal officers to
take arrestees before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay."
5. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
6. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
7. E.g., "There is no law, statute, or judicial decision anywhere in the nation
that designates a charge of 'investigation' or which permits prosecution officials
to hold an accused in custody for 72 hours, before the official may make a personal
determinations to either charge the accused with a crime or release him." VAHON,
SEARCHES, SEIZUREs AND IMMUNITIES vii (1961).
8. It is thought that the statutes directed to arrests without a warrant, as
compared to those with a warrant, are of principal importance. The arrest war-
rant is seldom used prior to arrest in current practice, and when used there is
almost always no need for further investigation.
9. They are: Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia and Wisconsin.
10. Some common limited statutes are those applying only to arrest by a private
person, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 160 (1958) ; only to extradition arrests,
e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 39-14-2 (1953); only to arrest with warrant, e.g.,
KANe. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 62-602 (1949); only to fresh pursuit situations, e.g.,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 596 (1957); or only to misdemeanors, e.g., VT. STAT.
ANN., tit. 13 § 5507 (1959).
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provision is that requiring a bringing before the magistrate "without
unnecessary delay," found in fifteen jurisdictions." Eleven others
employ similar language, such as "without delay,"12 "forthwith, ' 13
"with reasonable promptness,"' 4 "immediately,"," "immediately and
without delay,"1 6 or "until a legal warrant can be obtained."'1
Some states have by statute attempted to set a time limit on police
detention. A few merely set a time limit without indicating that any-
thing shorter is required.' 8 Others use terminology like that quoted
above, but in addition impose outside time limitations. 9 Finally, the
remaining three states have adopted a most interesting provision
whereby a maximum detention time is set by statute, but may be ex-
tended for a further set period by judicial order for "good cause
shown,' 2 a procedure not unlike that found in some other countries.2
11. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1418 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.23 (1961);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-615 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 660 (1961); IowA
CODE ANN. § 758.1 (1950); LA. REV. STAT. § 15:80 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.872 (1959); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2473 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-
6016 (1947); NEv. REV. STAT. § 171.300 (1960); N.Y. CODE CmUM. PROC. § 165;
N.D. Cent. Code tit. 29, § 29-05-20 (1960) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.05 (Bald-
win 1961); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 181 (1951); S.D. CODE § 34.1619 (Supp. 1960);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-13-17 (1953).
12. ORE. REV. STAT. § 181 (1951).
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-601 (1947); Ky. Crim. Code § 46; S.C. CODE § 17-261
(1952).
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6-49 (1958).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46 (1953) ("or ... as soon as may be"); TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 217 (1948).
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-140 (1961).
17. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1024 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147, § 4 (1954);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-401 (1956); Wyo. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 7-155 (1957).
18. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 255-9 (e) (1955) (48 hours); Mo. REV. STAT. § 544.170
(1959) (20 hours).
19. ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 66-5-34 (Supp. 1958) ("without unnecessary
delay, and in any event within twenty-four hours"); CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 825
(Deering 1961) ("without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two
days"); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-212 (Supp. 1961) ("without delay, . . . and any
person who is not conveyed before such officer within forty-eight hours shall be
released").
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1911 (1953) ("without unreasonable delay, and
in any event he shall, if possible, be so brought within twenty-four hours of arrest,
Sundays and holidays excluded" but the judge may grant additional time not
exceeding 48 hours); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:20, -:22, -:23 (1955) (similar,
with some minor variations); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-13 (1957) (similar, except
that the remand time is not to exceed 24 hours for residents or 48 hours for non-
residents). The remand provision is a part of the Uniform Arrest Act, adopted
in these three states with some minor variations.
21. E.g., in England, under the MAGISTRATES' COuRTS ACT §§ 6, 38, & 105, an
arrestee is to be brought before a magistrate "as soon as practicable" (a normal
standard of 24 hours is set, with special screening otherwise), but the magistrate
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In states with statutes employing general terminology without ex-
press time limits, police rights of detention must be clarified by case
law, just as in jurisdictions without statutes. As might be expected,
states with identical statutes have placed different interpretations
upon them. For example, the phrase "without unnecessary delay" has
been interpreted most strictly in New York,22 and the contention that
delay was needed for purpose of investigation has been said to be "no
excuse under the statutes."23 Yet, in interpreting the same words other
courts have approved detentions where "the officers in good faith were
energetically endeavoring to discover the true facts" 24 or where "the
crime committed has not been fully solved.1 25 States without statutes
are in similar disagreement.
2 6
This brief excursion into the law of the states makes it apparent that
there is no agreement on the question of when, if ever, the police are
entitled to detain a suspect for investigation. Moreover, it is a fair
statement that the law of the several states demonstrates the problem
has not received careful consideration. Most of the states with statutes
have merely adopted provisions found elsewhere, suggesting adequate
attention was not given to the issue by the legislatures. More signifi-
cant, however, is the fact that the great majority of the appellate cases
on police detention lack satisfactory analysis of the conflicting inter-
ests involved.
In recent years the day-to-day practices of the law enforcement
agencies in some states have been observed extensively.2 7 A review of
has the power to remand the accused in custody without bail for a period not
exceeding three days if remand is to the police, or for a period not exceeding
eight days, if remand is to prison. In France, under their new code, if it is
necessary to hold a person over 24 hours, he is to be taken before a procureur de
la Republique, who can authorize a further 24-hour period; See Berg, Criminal
Procedure: France, England, and the United States, 8 DE PAUL L. Rsv. 256,
286-87 (1959). In Japan, normally detention for investigation shall not exceed
10 days, but where a judge finds that "unavoidable circumstances" exist, the
detention may be extended ten or, in the case of certain specified crimes, fifteen
days; See Dando and Tamiya, Conditional Release of an Accused in Japan, 108
U. PA, L. REV. 323-24 (1960).
22. People v. Kelly, 8 App. Div. 2d 478, 188 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1959); People v.
Trinchillo, 2 App. Div. 2d 146, 153 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1956); Bass v. State, 196 Misc.
177, 92 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
23. People v. Snyder, 297 N.Y. 81, 92, 74 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1947).
24. Mooradian v. Davis, 302 Mich. 484, 489, 5 N.W.2d 435, 437 (1942).
25. People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281, 289, 89 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1949).
26. Compare State v. Beebe, 13 Kan. 589 (1874) with Peloquin v. Hibner, 231
Wis. 77, 285 N.W. 380 (1939).
27. The observations have been a part of the American Bar Foundation's
Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States. This
study, underwritten by a Ford Foundation grant, is concerned primarily with
isolating and identifying the critical problems in current criminal justice adminis-
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the data collected suggests that the courts and commentators have not
infrequently based their hypotheses concerning proper police norms
on assumptions that the criminal justice process is quite different than
it actually is, at least in these states. To the extent that the practices
observed in these few jurisdictions can be said to be typical of those
which would be found in other states, it may be well to re-examine the
obscured police detention problem through resort to analysis of these
practices. Such is the purpose of this article.
The practices to be reported below were observed in the states of
Michigan and Wisconsin, and predominantly in the cities of Milwaukee
and Detroit.28 The information was received through the fullest co-
operation of law enforcement officials with American Bar Foundation
field research personnel. Every effort has been made to preserve the
confidentiality of the sources of information. And, it would be well to
note at the outset that the purpose of this article is not to criticize any
department with respect to these most difficult problems, but rather to
report and analyze such practices as were observed in the hope that it
will provide a solid basis for improvement.
I. A LOOK AT CURRENT PRACTICES
An appreciation of the nature of the police detention problem re-
quires, initially, an adequate understanding of current detention prac-
tices. It is necessary to inquire into police investigation procedures,
and to learn of the possible opportunities persons in custody have to
obtain their release. Because the police are usually seeking evidence
which will either clear the suspect or justify proceeding against him
further, some discussion of the next possible step in the process, a
decision to charge, is warranted. Finally, the initial appearance before
the magistrate, the point at which police detention of those being pro-
ceeded against may be terminated, also deserves some consideration.
A. POLICE INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES
Sometimes persons are detained by the police for purposes of in-
vestigation without actually being taken to police headquarters. Per-
tration. The complete study, to be published soon, is based upon detailed observa-
tion in 1956-7 of the actual practices of police, prosecutors, courts and probation
and parole agencies in selected areas of the United States. Because references in
this article to "current" practices are also based upon these observations, it must
be emphasized that some of the practices may have changed since the time of
observation.
28. The confidential nature of much of the American Bar Foundation's data
requires that some practices not be identified with a specific locality. While all
of the practices reported in the following section were observed with sufficient
regularity to warrant the assumption they occur with some frequency, it should
not be assumed that any particular practice is to be found in both of these states
or that they are found throughout either of the jurisdictions.
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sons found under suspicious circumstances, especially at night, are
often stopped by patrolmen and questioned as to their identity and
purpose for being about. This practice, referred to by the police as
"field interrogation," may be accompanied by a frisk of the suspect
when the officer deems it necessary for his own protection. Reports
are often made of these field interrogations, which may later prove
most useful; for example, if a burglary is later reported in the area
where the suspicious person was found, the police then have a particu-
lar suspect who can be investigated further. Sometimes the suspect is
checked upon immediately, either by calling headquarters to see if he
is wanted or by checking out the suspect's story. While these deten-
tions usually last only a matter of minutes, the making of a check may
require additional time. If the suspect's story does not check out, if he
cannot provide adequate identification or if he refuses to respond to
the officer's questions, then an actual arrest will probably be made.
There are other kinds of investigations which may involve actual
detention of suspects but which the police do not view as actual arrests.
Both, while not observed with any great frequency, require the pres-
ence of the suspect at police headquarters. One practice is for the
patrolman to "invite" the suspect to headquarters so that the matter
can be cleared up. Another is for the officer to take the suspect to
headquarters, but to not regard or record the detention as an actual
arrest. In either instance, the suspect will remain at the station for a
matter of a few hours at the most unless an actual arrest is ultimately
made.
As to the actual arrests which are followed by detention for pur-
poses of investigation, most of them (especially in the larger cities)
are made in the early hours of the morning. The suspect is brought to
the local district or precinct station by the arresting officer. The super-
visory officer on duty often will conduct a preliminary and limited
interrogation of the suspect, usually for the purpose of merely decid-
ing whether the suspect should be released, held for a warrant (mean-
ing the police feel no further investigation is called for) or held for
investigation.
In Milwaukee, a person held for investigation is usually booked on
"suspicion of" a particular offense rather than "on the nose," a prac-
tice supported by regulations there.29 An identical practice prevails in
29. While it was indicated that this booking procedure is not condoned by the
department at the present time and reflects an older practice, the current regula-
tions instruct:
Arrested persons brought to any station by any member of the police force
shall be booked on the specific charge on which they are arrested. If an
arrest is made on suspicion, the prisoner shall be booked in the Register of
Arrests on Suspicion until the proper charge is determined, and then booked
in the Register of Arrests accordingly, using as the date and time of arrest
on such charge the same date and time as appear for the arrest on suspicion.
Milwaukee Police Dep't, Rules and Regulations, rule 33, § 2 (1950).
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Detroit, and again authority for the practice can be found in their
police manual.30 This investigation booking in both cities is merely a
bookkeeping function, in that it distinguishes those cases which are to
be handled by the detectives, and does not of itself show that the arrest
was illegal.2' Sometimes, particularly if grounds for arrest of the
offense suspected are in doubt, the booking may take a different form.
Perhaps the suspect is guilty of another offense, such as vagrancy, in
which case he will be booked on that charge. If the suspect is a pro-
bationer or parolee, his suspicious conduct may constitute possible
grounds for revocation, in which case a "hold" booking is used to
signify that he is being held for the probation-parole authorities.
Those held for investigation are processed to the detective bureau
for interrogation or other checking. Thus, the availability of detec-
tives is a significant factor in the time a particular suspect is held.32
30. The distinction between when the booking will be for "investigation of"
as opposed to "on the nose" is apparently the same as the distinction between
what is termed in the Police Manual a preliminary arrest and regular arrest. A
regular arrest includes only those cases in which the officer directly views the
offense, in which the arrest was by virtue of a warrant or capias, or where the
arrest is for violation of probation or for other authorities. Detroit Police Dep't,
Revised Police Manual, ch. 16 § 98 (1955).
31. It is sometimes assumed that all "investigation of" bookings are illegal:
Prior to the Mallory decision in the District of Columbia a very large per-
centage of all arrests were arrests made on the so-called charge of investiga-
tion. Since there is no such crime and no such charge known to the law,
naturally all of these arrests for investigation were illegal arrests.
Statement of National Bar Association in Hearings # 1, at 180, and see United
States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D.D.C. 1961), where the court in dictum
suggests that a "suspicion" booking in itself makes the custody illegal.
Similarly, it is assumed that "investigation of" bookings are a useful statistic
in tabulating the number of illegal arrests. E.g., Foote, Safeguards in the Law of
Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 16, 26 (1957). And, as to the Detroit practice, a De-
troit Bar Committee reported:
The measures taken by the Department during the past year have been
constructive and have undoubtedly reduced the number of illegal arrests.
Statistics submitted to us show that "investigation" arrests were reduced
from 15,465 during the first six months of 1958 to 11,686 during the first six
months of 1959 (a reduction of 3,767 or 24.4%).
28 DETROIT LAWYER 21 (1960).
32. The availability is in turn affected by the working hours of the detectives.
For example, in Detroit at the time of the observations, the bulk of the detective
force came on duty at 8:00 A. M. Though cases in which the suspect is in custody
take precedence over others, Detroit Police Dep't, Revised Police Manual, ch. 16,
§ 57 (1955), each detective team has a number of cases assigned to it, often
more than can be disposed of in a day's time. Most judges in Recorders Court will
not handle initial appearances after 11 o'clock in the morning, and this means
that the detectives must have satisfied themselves that there is sufficient evidence
for a warrant and must be at the prosecutor's office not later than 10 o'clock so
that the complaint and warrant can be prepared and approved. Thus, unless the
investigation can be completed in two hours, the suspect who is to be charged will
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The investigation usually involves questioning, but may also include
the holding of a showup, the checking of records on recent offenses or
the checking of physical evidence. Some of these investigative devices
take considerable time, and additional time is often required when the
suspected offense is of a kind investigated by a specialized bureau in
the department.
Interrogation is the principal investigative device, though relatively
little use is made of specialized and skilled interrogation techniques.
Questioning often begins with the officer obtaining basic information
concerning the suspect's prior record and the like for completion of an
"interrogation form." Then the inquiry moves on to the other matters
suggested by the arresting officer's report or the suspect's property.
Where no investigation is deemed necessary following arrest, the
arrestee will appear before the magistrate on the day of the arrest or
the morning following. In those cases in which investigation is de-
sired, detention up to 72 hours may occur.
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR RELEASE
Generally speaking, it can be said that those persons being detained
for investigation cannot obtain their immediate release. Usually the
first opportunity for release on bail comes only after the police have
taken the suspect before the magistrate. If some informal release
procedures exist for the convenience of persons who have been ar-
rested, they are not made available to persons the police desire to
detain for further investigation. Thus, while in Detroit many persons
avoid having to remain in custody pending the availability of a magis-
trate by resort to the "release bureau," the bureau will not normally
grant releases contrary to the wishes of the investigating officers.
Of course, persons being detained may attempt to obtain their re-
lease by way of a writ of habeas corpus, as this remedy is intended to
allow determination of the legality of official custody.-3 Particularly
in Detroit, but to a lesser extent elsewhere, the writ is resorted to by
persons detained by the police for investigation.
When a writ is received by the police, the officer in charge of the
investigation responds to it in court. If the officer arrives before the
time for the hearing, he will often contact the judge in his chambers
and explain the case to him, particularly any matters he does not want
probably be held over to the following day. It seems clear that if more detectives
were on hand at night when these cases arise many of the suspects could be
charged or released by the next morning; at the urging of the Detroit Bar Associ-
ation such a change has recently been accomplished. 28 DETROIT LAWYER 21
(1960).
33. Alicn. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.2250-.2270 (1938); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 292.01-.21
(1958).
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to disclose in open court, and may give his investigation report to the
judge to read. At the hearing in court, attended by the officer, the
prisoner and the prisoner's counsel, the officer will state briefly the
need for added time to conduct an investigation. The judge then de-
termines whether continued custody is to be allowed and, if so, for
how long.
The continuation of custody is accomplished by the judge granting
an adjournment or continuance (the terms are used interchangeably
by the judges) of the hearing for a given time. The time is usually
either 24 or 48 hours, though a lesser time may be set where it clearly
appears the investigation is about concluded.34 Because persons re-
sorting to the writ usually do so soon after arrest (with the hearing
set not more than a half day off), the judges are not allowing detention
in excess of 72 hours. In the relatively few cases in which a hearing
on writ discloses the person has already been in custody nearly this
long or perhaps longer, the judge will grant an outright release or a
very brief continuance. When a continuance for purposes of investiga-
tion is granted, the judge will almost always refuse to release the
suspect on bail.
In a few situations, where some special procedure is resorted to by
the police, the suspect may be retained in custody for a longer period,
perhaps a week or ten days. The police may view such an extended
investigation necessary in very serious cases, or when it is imperative
to communicate with the F.B.I. or other law enforcement agencies.
One device by which this extended detention is made possible is the
so-called "ten-day vag check." In such a case the officer handling the
investigation obtains a vagrancy warrant from the prosecutor. When
the case comes up in court, the suspect may be convicted for vagrancy,
or an assistant district attorney or police officer appears and asks for
a ten-day continuance, which is granted by the judge. If the suspect
is cleared before the ten days are up (sentences, where conviction is
obtained, are typically ten days), the untried vagrant is released with-
out trial and the convicted vagrant is often released without serving
the balance of his time.
A second device employed in order to detain suspects for investiga-
tion a longer time, though only against suspects having either pro-
bationer or parolee status,3 is the "probation hold" or "parolee hold."
It is merely another kind of booking, indicating that the person in
34. Some cases were observed in which the officer indicated that all that re-
mained to be done was to consult with an assistant prosecutor. The judge ad-
journed the hearing for a half hour.
35. This fact is usually determined by a routine check of police records, a
finding of a card indicating same in the suspect's wallet, questioning of the suspect
or contact with the probation or parole authorities.
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custody is being held by the police for the parole or probation authori-
ties, which might be used when it is desired that the probationer or
parolee be held for investigation for a week or ten days.30 Sometimes
the "hold" is used for investigative purposes with the consent and con-
currence of the probation or parole authorities, while on other occa-
sions no such concurrence is obtained or even requested. These "holds"
have proved very effective notwithstanding the uncertainty of their
exact legal status. The probationer or parolee now suspected of a new
offense has, in the usual case, done something which constitutes a
violation of the conditions of his parole or probation. Thus, he is not
in any position to challenge his continued detention. By cooperating
he has a good chance that the authorities will overlook the violation,
while challenge of his continued detention presents a considerable
threat of revocation.
C. THE CHARGING DECISION
When a suspect is detained for purposes of investigation following
the decision to arrest, the investigation is normally pursued with the
hope of obtaining additional information for use in making the next
decision in the process-the decision of whether or not to charge the
suspect with a crime. Because this is so, it is important to understand
the nature and function of this later decision.
The charging decision is usually made by the prosecutor or his
assistant, although a highly specialized and well-trained member of
the police department may perform this function in some cases. But,
by whomever made, the decision constitutes a judgment of whether or
not the suspect should be subjected to trial. It is a decision by a rep-
resentative of the prosecution that there appears to be sufficient prob-
ability of guilt to warrant expending further resources of the criminal
process for the purpose of obtaining a conviction. 80a Also, it is a
determination that the suspect is so probably guilty that the state is
justified in taking this next step, although it means the accused must
bear the economic costs of gaining his release and preparing for trial
and the social costs of loss of prestige and damage to reputation.
In the usual case the decision to charge is manifested by the prose-
36. For example, one probationer was arrested for investigation of a statutory
rape charge. The case was particularly difficult from the investigation standpoint,
as the girl involved had since been committed to a mental institution. After the
72 hours had passed, the maximum time the police thought a court would allow, a
probation hold was placed on the subject, and in this way the suspect was held
a total of seven days.
36a. It is not suggested, however, that it is always assumed that a full-blown
trial will be necessary or that any substantial expenditure of the prosecutor's
resources will be required. Most cases will be followed by a plea of guilty.
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cutor's approval of a police request for a warrant.37 The arrest war-
rant issued after a person is already in custody serves the sole function
of being a charging document. Although the law concerning who has
authority to issue an arrest warrant varies from state to state,38 it is
clear that the only real decision made in connection with its issuance
is that by the prosecutor or his representative.
How much evidence of guilt is required before a prosecutor is justi-
fied in charging a suspect? This is a difficult question to answer, as a
distinct probability of guilt standard for the charging decision has not
been expressly provided for by the law. Although it is clear that an
arrest warrant is to issue only upon "probable cause,"39 it would not be
accurate to declare this to be an assertion of the charging standard,
as the formal law has seldom conceived of the arrest warrant as a
charging document.
It might be said that the charging process really extends through
the preliminary examination, for at that time the prosecutor, if he has
decided to charge, must present sufficient evidence to the magistrate
to justify holding the defendant for trial. In this sense, it might very
well be said that the standard for charging contemplated by law is
that which must be met at the time of the preliminary. The magistrate
will hold the defendant for trial only if "probable cause" is estab-
lished,40 so it can be expected that the prosecutor at the time of charg-
ing will test the case by at least this standard.
When will the prosecutor "test" the evidence and make the charging
decision? It is clear that the charging decision is not of necessity
wedded to the warrant-issuing step; occasionally such warrants are
issued prior to arrest without any commitment to charge.41 Yet, the
prosecutor can hardly be expected to forego this decision until the
37. A warrant is rarely obtained prior to arrest. Rather, almost all arrests
are made without warrant. If an arrest is made with a warrant, the decision to
charge has usually already been made.
38. The statutes may give the full authority to the magistrate, e.g., KAN.
GEN. STAT. § 62-602 (1949) ; may require concurrence between the magistrate and
prosecutor, e.g., MicK. STAT. ANN. § 28.860 (1959); or may allow either a magis-
trate or district attorney to issue a warrant, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 954.01-.02
(1958).
39. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.02(2) (1958) ; People v. Beelby, 239 Mich. 386,
214 N.W. 183 (1927).
40. It should be cautioned at this point that the "probable cause" needed to
get by the preliminary examination is not necessarily the same as the "probable
cause" required for issuance of an arrest warrant, notwithstanding the identity
of label.
41. This may occur, for example, when it is desired to obtain prior testing of
the evidence so as to minimize the chances of a search being invalidated, or when
the whereabouts of the suspect is unknown and the warrant is needed to allow
arrest elsewhere.
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preliminary examination itself is upon him.42 Even more important,
it does not seem likely that the decision can be expected to be delayed
beyond the time at which the defendant is able to obtain his release on
bail, i.e., the initial appearance before a magistrate. Not only would
it probably be thought improper to demand bail of a person who may
not even be required to appear at any later proceedings, but also the
prosecutor will usually believe that he will not have any more informa-
tion relevant to his decision a few days hence than he possesses at the
present time. Thus it is that the preparation and approval of the
warrant, usually the last step before the initial appearance, has be-
come the manifestation of the charging decision in the usual case.
D. THE INITIAL APPEARANCE
The initial appearance, as the name suggests, is the first appearance
which the arrestee normally makes before a judicial officer. This stage
of the process is sometimes referred to as an arraignment, but this
tends toward confusion with the later arraignment on the information,
the point at which the defendant is called upon to plead. 43 This first
appearance has also been called the preliminary hearing, which also
causes confusion. 4 One function of the initial appearance is to de-
termine whether the defendant desires a preliminary hearing, at which
testimony would be taken to determine whether there is probable cause
to hold for trial.
In the observed jurisdictions the initial appearance does not include
a testing of the evidence by a judicial officer. In Mallory the Supreme
Court was concerned with prompt appearance "so that the issue of
probable cause may be promptly determined.145 The Court was appar-
42. This is because at the preliminary hearing the prosecutor will have to be
prepared to present sufficient evidence to the magistrate so that the defendant
may be held for trial. In Michigan the statutes require the preliminary be held
within ten days of the initial appearance, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.922 (1954), and
they are usually scheduled within a week. In Wisconsin, the statutes require the
preliminary be held within ten days unless the defendant consents to a longer
period. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.05 (1958).
43. See, for example, Exhibit 31, Hearings # 1, where state statutes concerning
arraignment on the information are collected, though the hearings were conducted
to study the problem of arraignment on the warrant.
44. See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 338 n.2a (D.C. Cir. 1960),
where the court indicates that "the hearing called for by Rule 5 [FED. R. CRIA1. P.]
is not an 'arraignment' but a preliminary examination of the arrested person."
However, the court failed to note that the rule also makes it clear that the first
appearance, which the court was actually concerned with, is not the preliminary.
Rule 5 merely calls it an "appearance before the commissioner," at which time
the commissioner, inter alia, is to "inform the defendant . . . of his right to have
a preliminary examination," which is to be held "within a reasonable time."
45. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
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ently referring to the fact that the federal rules require that a com-
plaint be filed with the commissioner and that the commissioner de-
termine the question of probable cause when issuing a warrant upon a
complaint.46 Similarly, in the states observed no initial appearance
would be concluded without the issuance of a warrant to the person
originally arrested without a warrant. However, in practice this de-
cision as to whether a warrant should issue is made by the prosecutor,
and even if the statutes contemplate some participation in the warrant-
issuing decision by the magistrate,47 he does not actually test the evi-
dence.
But, one significant aspect of the initial appearance is that bail is
set.48 Thus, if the suspect can make bail, the in-custody investigation
will be brought to a close. The suspect may be warned of his con-
stitutional rights, 4 a and in many localities will be insulated from the
police to some extent by being remanded to other authorities if he
cannot make bail.48b
II. THE BASIC ISSUES PRESENTED
Again it must be emphasized that the practices described above
were observed only in Michigan and Wisconsin, and predominantly
in Detroit and Milwaukee. But, even though it cannot be presumed
that the reported practices prevail country-wide, they nonetheless
suggest a number of significant issues which merit consideration in
any attempt to deal with the general problem of detention by the
police. Of these issues, those thought to be of primary importance are
as follows:
(1) When, if ever, is it desirable to allow a taking and continuance
of custody of a person who cannot be charged with a crime? This is
the most significant issue presented. Current practice demonstrates
that often custody is taken of a suspect, followed by a process of in-
quiry or investigation designed to obtain sufficient information to
satisfy the prosecutor. If a taking of custody is proper only when
there appears to be sufficient evidence to charge, then this detention
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3-5.
47. See note 38 supra.
48. In Michigan the general bail statute provides for the setting of bail by
"officers before whom persons charged with crime shall be brought." MicH STAT.
ANN. § 28.888 (1954). The Wisconsin statutes recognize a right to bail set by the
magistrate pending the preliminary examination. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 954.05
(1958).
48a. By statute in Michigan, a person charged with a felony is to be "informed
as to his rights," MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.885 (1959), but not infrequently the
only warning given was of the right to a preliminary examination.
48b. For example, the suspect may be placed in the county jail rather than
back in the local police station lock-up. See note 202 inf!ra.
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is difficult to support. However, if there are occasions when custody
has been validly taken, but a prosecutor would rightly refuse to charge
without additional evidence, then there may be some basis for allowing
in-custody investigation in some cases in order to reach the higher
standard.
(2) When, if ever, is it desirable to allow a taking and continuance
of custody of a person who cannot be arrested for the crime suspected?
Assuming that in-custody investigation of persons who cannot be
charged is sometimes possible, are there ever circumstances which
justify a like investigation of a person against whom there does not
even exist that amount of evidence needed to make a valid arrest for
the offense to be investigated? For example, what of a supposed
"voluntary" appearance at the police station at the "request" of the
police? What of a brief "detention" for investigation such as that con-
templated by the Uniform Arrest Act? Is it appropriate to detain the
suspect for investigation of the suspected offense on the basis of his
violation of probation or parole or his commission of another, less
serious offense?
(3) When, if ever, is it desirable to allow the continuance of custody
of a person who can be charged with the offense suspected? Assuming
now that the suspect could be charged, so that the prosecutor could
approve the issuance of a warrant and a taking of the suspect to the
magistrate for possible release on bail, confident that sufficient evi-
dence is at hand to show "probable cause" at the preliminary exami-
nation, should a right of in-custody investigation still exist for the
purpose of obtaining evidence sufficient for conviction? Or, what of
the recurring situations in which the police have reason to believe that
the suspect can provide information concerning another offense or an-
other offender and desire to continue the investigation along these
lines?
(4) What safeguards are desirable in order to guard against police
impropriety in the area of detention for investigation? Much of the
concern is directed to the fact that custody is frequently accompanied
by interrogation. Should questioning be allowed at all? If questioning
by the police is to be allowed, what added protections are needed for
the suspect? Should the interrogation be put in the hands of a mag-
istrate? Or, should instances of police in-custody investigation be sub-
ject to prior approval by a judicial officer? Should the police be free
to release those suspects they decide are not to be charged without
some judicial check?
A. TAKING AND CONTINUANCE OF CUSTODY OF A PERSON WHO
CANNOT BE CHARGED
The precise issue being put here is whether, under any circum-
stances, it is possible that an arrest has been lawfully made but yet,
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given this evidence upon which the arrest was based, the standard
contemplated by law for the charging of a person with a crime cannot
be met. In short, are the legal norms for arrest and charging the same,
or is the latter a more rigid standard? This issue is obviously basic to
our general inquiry; if arrest is sometimes legally possible when
charging is not, it would seem to follow that some interval for post-
arrest investigation must be allowed prior to the time at which the
prosecutor is to decide whether to charge the arrestee.
The assumption underlying the Mallory case seems to be that an
arrest is not to be made unless sufficient evidence is at hand to charge
the suspect. The Court said, "It is not the function of the police to
arrest, as it were, at large and to use an interrogating process at police
headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before a
committing magistrate on 'probable cause.' "49 It has sometimes been
asserted that this is also the system contemplated by the law in
many states.50
Language from a recent federal case5 decided under Mallory is most
representative of a contrary position. The two arrestees in that case
were suspected of being the two masked gunmen responsible for a re-
cent armed robbery, but they were arrested solely because a police
informant said that the brother of one of them had told him the two
were responsible, and the two fit the general description given by the
victims of the robbery. Said the court, in dicta:
Though the statements ...afforded grounds for arrest, the
officers must necessarily have had some doubts about whether
the two suspects should be formally charged with the crime in the
face of the vigorous denials of the suspects. . . .The quantum of
evidence necessary to sustain an arrest is not, in all circumstances,
the same quantum necessary to make out probable cause for
charging a person with the crime. . . We must not forget that
interrogation is not an evil per se but an absolute necessity and
that it often leads to releases, not charges. . . .Since the hearsay
evidence . ..was undoubtedly sufficient probable cause for ar-
rest, . . . the inquiry was not needed to bolster defendants'
arrest; but it could be conducted to determine whether the sus-
pects should be arraigned or released. 52
49. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957). If one places emphasis
upon the phrase "and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters," it
might be contended the Court was really concerned with arrests in which it was
anticipated the charging standard would be met by resort to interrogation.
50. See memo by Committee on the Bill of Rights, American Bar Association,
reprinted in Hearings # 1, at 36-38. See also statement by Edward Bennett
Williams, id. at 96.
51. Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
52. Id. at 342-44. A similar approach was expressed by Justice Jackson in
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 58 (1949) (separate opinion):
In each case police were confronted with one or more brutal murders
which the authorities were under the highest duty to solve. Each of these
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1. Arrest and Charging Standards Compared
Of course, the position that it is improper to arrest a person who
cannot be charged is not indefensible, but it implies that the privilege
to be free from detention (however brief) as a suspected offender is as
broad as the privilege to be free from prosecution as a criminal de-
fendant. The observed practice is not in accord with this view. More-
over, notwithstanding the uncertainty resulting from a failure of
either courts or legislatures to directly approach this question, it can
be said that the law contemplates arrest sometimes being proper where
charging would not. That is, there is some evidence that the arrest
and charging standards, by law, are not identical.
In what respects are the arrest and charging norms different? For
one thing, it would appear that the nature of the decision-maker itself
creates a difference. As the United States Supreme Court has observed
with regard to the requirements for arrest, "In dealing with probable
cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considera-
tions of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.153 No norm or standard can be precisely defined with-
out consideration of the persons to whom it is directed. Telling a
police officer that he may arrest those against whom there is "reason-
able grounds to believe" is different from telling a district attorney
that he may charge those against whom there exists "probable cause"
to believe in guilt.54 The prosecutor, being the "legal technician,"
might determine the evidence inadequate for charging even though the
making of an arrest by the police officer was not at all unreasonable.
Of course, what this will come down to in many cases is that the
murders was unwitnessed, and the only positive knowledge on which a solu-
tion could be based was possessed by the killer. In each there was reasonable
ground to suspect an individual but not enough legal evidence to charge him
with guilt. In each the police attempted to meet the situation by taking the
suspect into custody and interrogating him ....
[N]o one suggests that any course held promise of solution of these
murders other than to take the suspect into custody for questioning. The
alternative was to close the books on the crime and forget it, with the suspect
at large. This is a grave choice for a society in which two-thirds of the mur-
ders already are closed out as insoluble.
53. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Similarly, the Michi-
gan court has said that whether there are grounds for arrest
depends in every case upon the peculiar circumstances confronting the arrest-
ing officer. ... He makes this determination, and we review it, not as a legal
scholar determines the existence of consideration in support of a promise,
but as a man of reasonable prudence and caution would determine whether
the person arrested has committed a felony.
People v. Harper, 113 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Mich. 1962).
54. It is not suggested that the verbal formulation creates the difference. The
arrest norm is also sometimes stated to be "probable cause," but it still may be
different in fact from the charging standard.
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kind of evidence required by the prosecutor will be diffrent from that
required by the officer before an arrest is made. As a practical matter,
the prosecutor will test the evidence in terms of its admissibility in the
actual prosecution of the case, and for this reason will consider only
that evidence which he knows will be received in court. He may there-
fore have to ignore considerable information directly relating to the
guilt of the arrestee, as "much evidence of real and substantial proba-
tive value goes out on considerations irrelevant to its probative weight
but relevant to possible misunderstanding or misuse by the jury.'" 55
Even more important is the fact that a prosecutor who makes the
charging decision in strict conformance with the legal standard, as
reflected by the norm applicable when the decision to charge is tested
at the preliminary, will likewise apply the rules of evidence to the
available information.56 Yet, a police officer, in deciding whether
there are sufficient grounds for arrest, may consider such things as
the character of the suspect,57 his past record,58 and hearsay concern-
ing the commission of the offense.5 9 If an arrest is based in part upon
such information, the prosecutor is going to require that additional
evidence of guilt be obtained before charging.
Finally, the arrest and charging standards are bound to be different
because of the different circumstances under which the two decisions
are made. Because the police officer must frequently make the arrest
decision on the spur of the moment in remote locations and under diffi-
cult circumstances, some special factors may allow for a lawful arrest
to be made on evidence which in other cases would not be sufficient for
arrest. The seriousness of the offense is one such factor-a suspected
murderer could be arrested on a lesser probability of guilt than a
55. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949).
56. Thus, hearsay is not be considered in determining whether there is probable
cause at the preliminary. People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953).
Since the evidence at the preliminary is heard only by the judge, the reason for
exclusion stated in Brinegar (text at footnote 55) could hardly apply. Rather,
the apparent rationale is that since the issue is whether there is enough evidence
to justify subjecting the defendant to trial, it involves some consideration of the
likelihood of conviction, in which case the evidence must be considered in terms
of admissibility at the trial.
57. People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 196 N.W. 971 (1924).
58. Smith v. Hem, 102 Kan. 373, 170 Pac. 990 (1918).
59. People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953). In this case the
court held that hearsay evidence was admissible at the preliminary examination
for the purpose of showing that the officers were justified in making an arrest,
but not for the purpose of proving probable cause at the preliminary.
State v. Cox, 258 Wis. 162, 45 N.W.2d 100 (1950); Scaffido v. State, 215 Wis.
389, 254 N.W. 651 (1934). The dissenting judge in Cox said, "It does not seem
to me to be logical to contend that an arrest can be justified if it is based only
upon what an officer may have heard from others."
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suspected numbers carrier.60 While the Restatement of Torts' defini-
tion of the peace officer's privilege lists this as a factor,,1 such express
recognition by the commentators6 2 or the courts 63 is unusual. There is
evidence, however, that the seriousness of the offense actually plays a
part in a court's determination of whether a given arrest is valid.0'
Often immediate action is necessary on the part of a police officer
60. The rationale of such a position is that a greater interference with in-
dividual liberty is warranted where the crime is of a very serious nature. Though
speaking of searches, Justice Jackson expressed such a view when he said:
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped [sic] and the officers
throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might
be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However,
I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in
good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indig-
nity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious
crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
61. The nature of the crime committed or feared, the chance of the escape
of the one suspected, the harm to others to be anticipated if he escapes and
the harm to him if he is arrested, are important factors to be considered in
determining whether the actor's suspicion is sufficiently reasonable to con-
fer upon him the privilege to make the arrest.
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 119, comment i (1934).
62. An exception is the following:
If the police were reliably informed that a given crime was committed by a
man fitting a certain description, and they could determine that there were
in the vicinity 50 men answering that description, any one of these 50 would
be the be extent that it was much moreprobable than the average that he was guilty. Yet as the chances of guilt
as to any one of these individuals would still be only one in 50, it wo ldhardly seem proper to arrest all of them, in the hope that a process of inter-
rogation at police hadquarters would isolat e guilty person. In determin-ing whether such drastic action would ever be reasonable, one would prob-
ably weigh the seriousness of the crime; a kidnapping where 
the life of the
victim was at sake might be considered to warrant such greater 
invasion of
personal liberty than would be the case in a routine burglary.
Poblems of the Protectiom of Humnan Rights i Ciminal Law and Pocedure,
U.N. SnMIN oN THE PROTECTION OF HUAN RIGTS IN CRIIAL LAW AND
PRCEUR, Working Paper H [TE 326/1 (40-2) LA] (1958).
63. An exception is the following from United States v. Kanso, 
252 F.2d 220,
222 (2d Cir. 1958) :
The word "reasonable" is not to be constued in the abstract 
or in a vacuum
unrelated to the field to which it applies. Standards which might 
be reason-
able for the apprehension of bank robbers might not be reasonable 
for the
arrest of narcotics peddlers.
64. For example, the ichigan court has upheld an arrest for kidnapping where
made upon the sole basis that an officer had observed a car 
circling the block with
the occupants "apparently closely watching all onlookers," 
People v. inchella,
268 Mich. 123, 255 N.W. 735 (1934), but has declared invalid an arrest for boot-legging made because the occupants of a car traveling very slowly 
looked back at
the motorcycle officer who passed them. People v. oache, 237 
ich. 215, 211 N.W.
742 (1927). Thus, to the extent the seriousness of the offense is a factor, 
it has
been relegated to a sub rosa position.
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because the opportunity to arrest may soon pass. For this reason the
courts have indicated that such facts as the chance of a quick getaway,
danger to the public or threat of further harm to the victim may
justify arrest upon evidence which would otherwise be insufficient.65
By comparison, the prosecutor makes the charging decision within the
confines of his own office, faced with no emergency and with time for
reflection. For this reason, a legal arrest in an emergency situation
may not justify charging without more evidence. For example, while
it might be proper for the police to arrest three persons leaving a
crime scene and fitting the general description given by the victim,66
65. Thus, in one case the court hypothesized concerning a bank robber who could
be expected to make a quick getaway, and stated:
If the officer must delay to ascertain that the information received comes
from a responsible person, in many cases the opportunity to arrest will have
passed. That officers do make arrests on such information, and that they are
complimented on their promptness in doing so, is a matter of common
knowledge.
People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 51, 196 N.W. 971, 972 (1924). Similarly, the court
on another occasion noted that "delay in arrest may endanger the public by per-
mitting a felon to remain at large" and "may also permit his escape." Leisure v.
Hicks, 336 Mich. 148, 57 N.W.2d 473 (1953). And, in another case the court also
mentioned the need for action without checking the story of the accuser (which
might otherwise be necessary). The facts indicated that further harm might be
caused the supposed victim if there were delay. Hammitt v. Straley, 338 Mich.
587, 61 N.W.2d 641 (1953).
66. It would seem that the "reasonable grounds to believe" test would some-
times allow for arrest of more than one suspect. See 1 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 119,
illustration 2 (1934). The problem is precisely what degree of belief is required
with respect to the arrestee; if the arrestee must be more probably guilty than
any other suspect, then obviously only one suspect can be arrested. Commen-
tators who assert that the police are acting illegally when they arrest more
than one suspect rarely cite authority, nor do those taking the contrary position.
Professor Waite, commenting on the famous Degnan murder case in Chicago,
where two janitors were held for questioning, says: "As the news accounts make
rather clear that no one supposed the two janitors had cobperated, but that if one
was guilty the other was not, it would be extremely difficult to justify both arrests
on this ground of reasonable belief in the arrestee's guilt." Waite, The Law of
Arrest, 24 TEXAs L. Rzv. 279, 297 (1946). The Mallory ease may be the best
authority that, at least in the federal system, such a practice is illegal. One pro-
fessor has asserted: "Remember that in the Mallory case the police suspicions ex-
tended also to the defendant's two nephews, and they were arrested and detained
four hours without the slightest shadow of justification." Letter from Prof. J. D.
O'Reilly, in Hearings # 1. Thus, the Mallory case is said to require evidence
sufficient to charge one and only one person prior to arrest. Statement of National
Bar Association, Hearing # 1, at 179. Similarly, the president of the Washington
Bar Association took the position that the "probable cause" arrest norm on the
federal level prevents arrest of more than one person for a single person crime.
Hearings # 2, at 110-13.
Compare with the preceding the following statement concerning Mallory: "In
that case there were three suspects. There was reasonable ground to arrest every
one of them. After an interrogation of each of the three, two were cleared within
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it would not seem appropriate for the prosecutor to charge all three,
or to charge any one of the three without more evidence of his guilt
than was apparent at the time of arrest.
Thus, notwithstanding the lack of judicial language expressly recog-
nizing a difference in the arrest and charging standards, a comparison
of the criteria recognized by law for these tvo decision-points in the
process suggests the police may sometimes have properly arrested a
person the prosecutor would likewise quite properly refuse to charge.
It might be added that the prosecutor's refusal will sometimes gain
added justification because of events subsequent to arrest. For ex-
ample, if two armed robbery suspects should vigorously deny any
implication in the crime after their arrest, based upon their general
resemblance to the responsible parties and their being identified by a
police informant, would it not be inappropriate for the prosecutor to
charge the suspects without first at least requiring the accuser to con-
front them and repeat the accusation ?67 The added fact of the denial
following arrest might warrant a refusal to charge even when the
original grounds for arrest were also sufficient for charging purposes.08
2. Detention to Obtain Evidence Sufficient for Charging
Perhaps the best evidence that at least some courts consider the
arrest and charging standards to be different is the fact that they
uphold detention following arrest on the basis that the police were
seeking evidence sufficient to charge. The observed jurisdictions,
Michigan and Wisconsin, hold to this view, and in this sense present a
most interesting contrast to the familiar Mallory position.
Notwithstanding earlier judicial language to the contrary,"" it would
appear that both jurisdictions now approve of the observed practice
a few hours and the third was held." Statement of the Honorable Alexander
Holtzoff, U.S. district judge for the District of Columbia, in Hearings # 1, at 4-5.
Perkins writes that reasonable cause only requires
grounds sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent man to believe the arrestee
guilty of the crime for which the arrest is made or to cause him to believe
there is likelihood of such guilt. The latter qualification is sufficient to per-
mit an officer to arrest two persons, for example, if he has reason to believe
a felony has been committed by one or the other.
Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 238 (1940).
67. These facts are from Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.
1960), wherein the court said, "If a suspect, arrested or not, denies knowledge of
a crime, the police are entitled, if indeed not obligated, to confront him with those
who have implicated him." Id. at 344.
68. Even the Mallory Court seemed to grant this, saying, "Circumstances may
justify a brief delay between arrest and arraignment, as for instance, where the
story volunteered by the accused is susceptible of quick verification through third
parties." Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).
69. See Bailey v. Loomis, 228 Mich. 338, 200 N.W. 148 (1924) ; Geldon v. Finne-
gan, 213 Wis. 539, 252 N.W. 369 (1934).
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of arresting a suspect on "reasonable grounds to believe" and then
detaining him for a brief period in an attempt to obtain evidence
sufficient for charging. The Michigan case of Mooradian v Davis70 is
an excellent example of a situation in which the prosecutor might
properly want more evidence before charging the arrestee. After a fire
of apparently incendiary character, all of the evidence seemed to point
toward the individual who was purchasing the building on land con-
tract: he was in default of payments; foreclosure was threatened;
because of a previous fire, he had received insurance payments which
he applied on the contract; he had shortly before the fire materially
increased the amount of his insurance coverage; he was the last person
to leave the building and the only person with a key; and evidence of
arson was found within. He was placed under arrest on Monday, but
on Tuesday the prosecutor refused a warrant and asked for further
investigation. On Thursday the man was taken into court because a
writ of habeas corpus had been filed, and the judge directed the man
be charged or released by 3 P. M. The prosecuting attorney again
refused to approve a warrant, stating that he wanted proof the suspect
was in the area at the time of the fire. The supreme court approved
the lower court's referral of the reasonableness of detention question
to the jury (which found the time reasonable). The court emphasized
that, "the record leaves no doubt that the officers in good faith were
energetically endeavoring to discover the true facts and circumstances
throughout the short period during which appellant was in custody."' 1
The court did not expressly state that the investigation was (or must
be) for purposes of obtaining evidence to charge, although the facts
made it clear the police were attempting to obtain evidence to satisfy
the prosecutor. However, a more recent decision by the court suggests
such a limitation. This is the case of People v. Hamilton,2 which also
happens to be the first state case adopting the Mallory sanction of
exclusion of statements received during illegal detention. The police
investigated the murder of one Hirmiz, and questioned the decedent's
wife, who had been found at the murder scene bound hand and foot.
She contended that a stranger had entered the apartment and killed
her husband, but upon further questioning the police detected some
flaws in her story. Hamilton, a friend of the family, arrived on the
scene shortly after the police, and for reasons not set forth he was
arrested with Mrs. Hirmiz. These arrests occurred Friday morning,
and Saturday morning Mrs. Hirmiz confessed that she and Hamilton
70. 302 Mich. 484, 5 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
71. Id. at 489, 5 N.W.2d at 437.
72. 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
73. The Hamilton case illustrates well that the appropriateness of the Mallory
norm and of the Mallory sanction are two quite separate and distinct questions.
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had done the killing. Using her confession, the police then questioned
Hamilton, who finally gave a confession the following Monday evening.
Although some of the court's language suggests adoption of the
Mallory norm as well as the Mallory sanction, 7 the primary concern
of the court seems to be the fact that prior to the time of Hamilton's
confession the police had sufficient evidence at hand for charging him
with murder:
Hamilton's continued detention . . . was unlawful because the
delay was unnecessary, and unlawful because its manifest purpose
was that of "sweating" a confession after the officers were fully
enabled to complain and arraign .. .. Here the delay (from and
after, at least, the time of Mrs. Hirmiz' confession) was "unneces-
sary" as a matter of law .. . . Hamilton should have been taken
before a magistrate no later than Saturday afternoon, immedi-
ately following the confession of his co-defendant.7 r
The Wisconsin court has taken a similar approach. In Peloquin v.
HibnerT ' the plaintiff was held while her co-suspects were apprehended
and brought back to the county, where all could be questioned and
their stories checked. The court noted the grounds for arrest were
present, and then said that the two-day detention was proper.
This was the earliest opportunity the sheriff had to obtain state-
ments from the Peloquins and to check their statements with the
information he had obtained up to that time relative to the bank
robbery. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the period of
detention must be determined from the facts and circumstances
in each case. There is no suggestion that the sheriff and the dis-
trict attorney of Columbia county did not expedite their investi-
gation following the examinations on Monday night, with due
diligence and dispatch. The defendants [police] and the district
attorney were entitled to a reasonable time on Tuesday, June 1st,
as a matter of law, to determine whether to make a formal com-
plaint against the plaintiff or release her from custody.77
The implication in Peloquin that in some cases where there are
grounds to arrest it is necessary to obtain further evidence before
74. From time to time the court makes statements suggesting the Michigan rule
is now the equivalent of the federal standard: "[TJhe reasoning of Mallory ...
and Upshaw ... should be inosculated with quoted sections 13 and 26 [the Mich-
igan statutes requiring production before the magistrate "without unnecessary
delay"] quite as firmly as if written therein." People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410,
415-16, 102 N.W.2d 738, 741-42 (1960). "Said sections 13 and 26, and Rule 5(a)
of the Federal rules of criminal procedure are quite alike and equally mandatory."
Id. at 416, 102 N.W.2d at 742.
That the court did not really adopt the federal standard seems clear from the
more recent case of People v. Harper, 113 N.W.2d 808 (Mich 1962).
75. People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 416-17, 102 N.W.2d 738, 742 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
76. 231 Wis. 77, 285 N.W. 380 (1939).
77. Id. at 86-87, 285 N.W. at 385. (Emphasis added.)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss3/6
POLICE DETENTION
charging, with reasonable detention for this purpose proper, is further
supported by State v. Francisco.8 In proceedings in juvenile court to
determine the mental condition of a 17-year-old girl, she told of having
sexual relations with her stepfather. Upon this evidence the step-
father was arrested, and was questioned in the district attorney's office
for an hour prior to initial appearance. In response to the defendant's
reliance on the McNabb case, the court said:
Was the mere taking of defendant to the district attorney's office
for questioning a violation of his constitutional rights? It would
appear that the district attorney had not made up his mind to
prosecute at the time he sent for the defendant. The intelligence
of the girl was below normal. The district attorney had the duty
of checking her story, and the method selected by him was not
unreasonable."9
Thus, both states recognize a right of detention following a valid
arrest where it is necessary to obtain additional evidence sufficient for
charging. As to the length of the detention, no set time period applies
to every case; a detention does not automatically become unreasonable
because of the passage of two hours, ten hours, twenty-four hours or
some other span of time.8 0 The investigation must be carried on with
"due diligence and dispatch,"'81 and if the police have made no progress
after a time they may be obligated to release the suspect.8 2 The nature
of the crime is a factor, so that offenses usually requiring detailed in-
vestigation allow longer detention. 3
3. Challenge of Detention by Writ of Habeas Corpus
The practice, described earlier, of judges postponing hearings based
upon writs of habeas corpus and remanding the suspects into police
custody would undoubtedly be labeled by many as highly improper.
Indeed, this may be why there has been some disbelief that such a
78. 257 Wis. 247, 43 N.W.2d 38 (1950).
79. Id. at 252, 43 N.W.2d at 40-41. (Emphasis added).
80. Geldon v. Finnegan, 213 Wis. 539, 252 N.W. 369 (1934). Rather, the cir-
cumstances of the particular case must be looked to. Peloquin v. Hibner, 231 Wis.
77, 285 N.W. 380 (1939).
In view of the above Wisconsin position, it is interesting to note that a move-
ment in Wisconsin to adopt the Uniform Arrest Act detention provision, allowing
24 hours and 48 additional hours upon good cause shown to a judge, was defeated
primarily because of the opposition of law enforcement officers, who viewed the
flexible rule as more desirable.
81. Peloquin v. Hibner, supra note 80.
82. Leisure v. Hicks, 336 Mich. 148, 57 N.W.2d 473 (1953).
83. "The crime of arson, of which plaintiff was suspected, is generally one
requiring detailed and sometimes prolonged investigation." Mooradian v. Davis,
802 Mich. 484, 488-89, 5 N.W.2d 435, 437 (1942).
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practice exists at all. 4 A jurisdiction conforming to Mallory could
hardly justify such procedures. But in states like Wisconsin and
Michigan, where the appellate courts have recognized a right to detain
suspects for investigation in given circumstances, it would seem to
follow that there may be times when such a remand is quite appro-
priate8 5
The writ of habeas corpus is intended to be available in order that
authorities may be required to establish the legality of the detention
of persons being held by them.8 If there is a legal basis for the cus-
tody, then the person is not entitled to release. Consequently, a judge
acting in accordance with the law on arrest, charging and detention
discussed above might properly find that the police are legally detain-
ing the suspect. He could remand the suspect into police custody if he
found (a) that sufficient grounds for arrest exist, (b) that sufficient
grounds for charging do not exist and (c) that the appropriate time
for investigation has not expired .8
Assuming, then, that the judge at the hearing may have an alterna-
tive other than setting the suspect free if he cannot presently be
charged, it still might be questioned whether it is appropriate for the
judge to proceed to set a time limit on the further investigation. How-
ever, such power would seem a necessary consequence of the right to
determine whether the time for in-custody investigation had yet ended.
It is undoubtedly true that at the hearing on the writ the judge cannot
possibly correctly predict the course which the continuing investiga-
tion will take, so that the time in the future at which it no longer
would be proper to hold the suspect cannot be exactly determined. Yet,
the setting of such a time is undoubtedly preferable to the alternative
of limiting the hearing to the question of whether detention at the
present time is lawful, for this would require and allow the suspect
to petition for these writs continually until it was finally determined
that the permissible time had run.
84. If habeas corpus was brought, we believe that no court would permit
custody without conmital to be continued an instant because of the desira-
bility of interrogation or the inadvisability of warning confederates. We
know of no case which could be cited to bar the writ on such grounds.
Memorandum by A.B.A. Committee on the Bill of Rights, 1944, reprinted in
Hearings # 1, at 37-38.
85. The practice has come to the attention of the supreme court in both Michi-
gan and Wisconsin, and neither court criticized it. Mooradian v. Davis, 302 Mich.
484, 5 N.W.2d 435 (1942) ; State v. Babich, 258 Wis. 290, 45 N.W.2d 660 (1951).
86. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.2250-.2270 (1938); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 292.01
(1958).
87. The practice in these states, then, if it is to be criticized, might best be
criticized on the grounds that (1) defense counsel and judges have neglected to
insure that at least the original arrest was legal, and (2) the need for further
investigation is not as carefully considered as it should be, and is often in part
based upon information received ex parte in the judge's chambers.
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Still assuming a criminal justice system like that made possible by
the law in Michigan and Wisconsin, it must follow that at a writ of
habeas corpus hearing at which it has been determined that the time
has not run, denial of bail may be warranted. The provisions for bail
in the habeas corpus statutes are not inconsistent with this assertion,88
nor are the general bail statutes. 9 Indeed, the release of a person on
bail when the time for in-custody investigation had not expired would
be improper.90
Yet, it is not clear that denial of bail will always be the proper
course. Conceivably an arrest may sometimes be made on evidence
insufficient for charging, but the mode of investigation most appropri-
ate to determine whether to charge or release may not require the
continued presence of the suspect. For example, it may become appar-
ent that the charging decision can be made after tracing certain prop-
erty found on the person of the suspect at the time of arrest. Under
these circumstances, it might be contended that (a) the suspect should
be released outright; (b) the suspect should be released on bail; or
(c) the suspect should not be released until the investigation is com-
pleted. The first of these positions rests upon the notion that it should
not be necessary for a person to pay money to gain his release when
he cannot even be charged and his presence is not essential to the con-
tinuance of the investigation. The second stresses the fact that one
reason behind allowing arrest of one who cannot be charged is the
fear that the suspect will not later be amenable to arrest. The third
position suggests that the insured continued availability of the suspect
is a benefit not outweighed by the additional inconvenience to the
suspect of having to remain in custody for a short period of investiga-
tion. No court decision dealing with this issue has been found.
B. TAKING AND CONTINUANCE OF CUSTODY OF A PERSON
WHO CANNOT BE ARRESTED FOR THE CRIME SUSPECTED
Even if the arrest norms allow a taking of custody on evidence in-
sufficient for charging, the police still may sometimes suspect persons
of complicity in outstanding offenses but lack sufficient evidence to
arrest for the offenses suspected. Should the police have any rights
88. The Michigan and Wisconsin habeas corpus statutes merely speak of bail
"if the case be bailable." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.2274 (1938); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 292.23 (1958). Thus, it would appear that no right to bail is given which does
not otherwise exist.
89. The general statutes on bail merely refer to cases where the person has been
"charged" or where a "warrant issued." See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.888 (1938);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 954.034 (1958).
90. The Michigan court indicated that absolute release under such circum-
stances was not proper. Hammitt v. Straley, 338 Mich. 587, 61 N.W.2d 641
(1953).
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to conduct an in-custody investigation under these circumstances?
Should the police be entitled to detain the suspect briefly on grounds
insufficient for arrest if the detention is not considered as, or recorded
as an arrest? What rights should the police have to induce suspects
to accompany them to the station for questioning? Is it ever proper
for the police, solely because they desire to investigate the offense
suspected, to arrest the suspect for another, minor offense or to take
the suspect into custody for violation of the conditions of his parole
or probation?
1. Short Detention Not Considered an Arrest
Any inquiry into the question of whether the police should ever be
entitled to detain a suspect briefly without making an arrest must of
necessity include consideration of the Uniform Arrest Act. The Act,
proposed in 1942 by the Interstate Crime Commission, has been
adopted in three states.91 Section 2 of the Act provides:
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has
reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name,
address, business abroad and whither he is going,
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or
explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be de-
tained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section
shall not exceed two hours. The detention is not an arrest and
shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end
of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be ar-
rested and charged with a crime. 92
The above language describes two different situations in which
officers supposedly might briefly detain a suspect without making an
arrest. One is the momentary stopping on the street, usually denomi-
nated "field interrogation" by the police,93 in order to make inquiries
concerning the suspect's identity and business. The second is a brief
detention at precinct headquarters not recorded as an arrest. Not-
withstanding a lack of express authority for either practice in the
jurisdictions observed, both occur with some regularity. Although the
two procedures raise similar questions, they are best dealt with sep-
arately.
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594.2
(1955); R. L GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, ch. 7 (1957).
92. The Act is reprinted in its entirety in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942).
93. See BRISTOW, FIEL INTERROGATION (1958).
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a. "Field Interrogation"
It would seem apparent that the mere asking of questions, without
the presence of actual restraint, can hardly be labeled as improper."
However, many instances of field interrogation seem subject to pos-
sible objection because the circumstances reasonably suggest to the
suspect that failure to cooperate will result in actual restraint.9 5 Thus,
the precise question is whether brief field interrogation, accompanied
with such restraint, can ever be proper when sufficient grounds do not
exist for the making of an arrest.
A most distressing fact is that courts confronted with exactly this
issue have seldom faced up to it squarely. In part this is due to the
way in which field interrogation cases have reached the appellate
courts. Either the suspect sues for false imprisonment,98 in which
case the officer will assert that an arrest was made in order to bring
himself within the one generally recognized privilege category, or the
suspect ultimately finds himself trying to keep out of evidence mate-
rials found in a frisk accompanying the interrogation, in which case
the prosecution will argue that there has been a search incident to a
lawful arrest.97 In either case the legality of field interrogation is
never determined.
One unfortunate result has been an oversimplified "single problem"
conception of quite different situations. The reasoning employed has
been as follows: requiring a suspect to delay his journey while ques-
tions are put to him constitutes a restraint, "any restraint of liberty
is an arrest,"'98 therefore it follows that an officer cannot engage in
such conduct unless the grounds for arrest are present.9 9 This is
94. Note, Arrest-Stopping and Questioning as an Arrest, 37 MIcH. L. Rsv. 311
(1938).
95. Custody is "an actual restraint of the person to be arrested," which
occurs at the moment an individual is no longer a free agent to do as he
pleases.... Often this is not easy to determine, as where an officer says to
a pedestrian, "Just a minute, I want to ask you a few questions." Were a
civilian to ask such a question there would certainly be no restraint, but
what on their face are merely words of request take on color from the
officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor.
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?,
51 J. CRM. L., C. & P.S. 402, 403 (1960).
96. I believe the relative dearth of authority in point can be explained by the
fact that few litigants have ever seriously contended that it was illegal for
an officer to stop and question a person unless he had "probable cause" for a
formal arrest.
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
97. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Question-
ing and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General,
51 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 386-87 (1960).
98. People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 872, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326, 332 (Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1922).
99. The best illustration of this is Esposito, supra note 98. Other cases holding
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
clearly a non sequitur, as is the equally absurd proposition that the
practice of stopping and questioning must be denominated an arrest
in order to allow persons to bring suit for its abuse.100 This is not to
say that the law might not ultimately take the position that field inter-
rogation is to be allowed only when there are grounds to arrest. But,
such a result should not be reached upon the assumption that stopping
and questioning must be called an arrest and must be dealt with as
such.
Decisions made at different points in the criminal justice process
vary in their impact upon the person being subjected to them. How-
ever, an overall view of the system allows the generalization that those
decisions having more serious consequences for the individual require
a greater degree of certainty that he is that person against whom the
official power of the state should be used. Thus, actual conviction of a
criminal offense, whereby the imposition of penal sanctions is made
possible and the status of criminal is fully bestowed upon the defend-
ant,101 requires proof of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." Charging
a person with a crime, a formal and public accusation of criminal
conduct which requires the accused to defend himself at trial, is
possible only when there is "probable cause" to believe the accused
guilty. And, as has been discussed in more detail earlier, the arrest of
a suspect, with its less serious implications, may sometimes be possible
on even a lesser quantum of evidence. The probability of guilt profile
of the system, under this analysis, would be that of a series of suc-
cessively higher steps. The present inquiry, as related to this profile,
is whether there should be a still lower step at an even earlier stage
in the process-the decision to investigate102
there is no right to question: Arnold v. State, 255 App. Div. 422, 8 N.Y.S.2d 28
(1938); People v. Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (City Magis. Ct.
1957); Shirey v. State, 321 P.2d 981 (Okla. Crim. 1958); Commonwealth v. Doe,
109 Pa. Sup. 187, 167 At. 241 (1933); Travis v. Bacherig, 7 Tenn. App. 638
(1928).
100. By a literal application of the narrower definition, a search of the
person, detention for questioning and investigation and wholesale round-ups
of suspects would not be arrests. This means that the police may engage in
such activities without being subject to the sanctions for an unlawful arrest.
Note, 100 U. PA. L. Ray. 1182, 1186 (1952).
101. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543,
590-92 (1960), on status degradation.
102. The same question might be asked concerning some other investigative
devices. The police must use active detection methods against prostitution, homo-
sexuality, sale of narcotics and the like. It was observed that some judges were
throwing out eases for supposed "entrapment" or "enticement," not because en-
trapment had occurred in the strict legal sense, but because it became apparent
that the police were not being sufficiently selective in deciding whom to approach.
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The step profile suggests that the probability of guilt required to
subject a person to official action is directly correlated to the degree
of interference with individual freedom contemplated by the action.
If this is so, the propriety of field interrogation of persons not subject
to arrest might be determined by resort to analysis of the consequences
flowing from such investigation as compared to those following actual
arrest. 0 3 Does it make any difference that the field interrogation
typically results in a much shorter period of detention than actual
arrest?'0 4 Does it make any difference that the suspect will not have a
recorded arrest, but that at most a field interrogation report bearing
his name will be filed? 104a Does it make any difference that the suspect
will undoubtedly not consider himself under arrest,0 5 and consequently
could in all honesty answer in the negative if later asked whether he
had ever been arrested? 08 Is being subjected to field interrogation as
damaging to reputation as actual arrest? These questions have not
been adequately explored, even by the courts which have upheld the
right of the police to stop and question suspects. 0 7
103. This approach may be equally apropos for determining whether the
practice is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against "unreasonable"
seizures. For a contrary view, see Foote, supra note 95, and Foote, Safeguards
in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 36-37 (1957). The issue was presented
to the Supreme Court in Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) and Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), but the cases were decided upon other
grounds.
104. The stopping and questioning of a person on the street usually takes only
a few minutes, while a person taken to the station is detained at least a matter
of hours and perhaps substantially longer. The distinction does not hold true in
all cases, however. Sometimes persons who have been arrested are released almost
immediately, and a person detained on the street may be kept from going his way
for a substantial period of time if the investigating officer is awaiting the arrival
of witnesses or a report from headquarters.
104a. It might also be relevant to inquire into permanency of arrest records
and field interrogation records in cases not ultimately resulting in further action.
Some states have legislated on the subject, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28 (1959),
requiring the return of arrest records where the person arrested was not brought
to trial, or if brought to trial was acquitted; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 944 (1961) ;
OHIO REV. CODE § 5149.05 (1961); ILL. REv. STAT., c.38, §5 (1961), all requiring
return of photographs, fingerprints, and other records of identification under
certain circumstances. Query the application of such statutes to field interrogation
reports.
For a more complete discussion of these statutes, including similar provisions
found in England and Australia, see 22 CALIF. Ass'y INTERnIM COMM. RPTS. 1959-
61, no. 1, Report of Ass'y Interim Comm. on Crim. Proc. 58-71 (1961).
105. "A layman, if asked if he had even [sic] been arrested, would not be
likely to describe situations where he had been stopped by a police officer .
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
106. However, employment forms may also inquire as to non-arrest police
detention. See note 124 infra.
107. The cases cited in Remington, supra note 97, at 391 nn.30 & 31.
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Of course, were a new "step" recognized in the process, it would be
necessary to articulate and define the probability of guilt required. If
something less than "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable cause" to
believe is needed, precisely what quantum of evidence is enough? The
Uniform Arrest Act proposes "reasonable grounds to suspect," which
on one occasion has been interpreted as synonymous with the arrest
norm.208 Difficulty in developing a workable test can be anticipated,
but it has quite properly been observed that "the obvious difficulty of
the task does not justify the easy alternative of ignoring the issue."10'
b. Brief Unrecorded Detention at the Station
Once again the basic assumption is that we are dealing with a situa-
tion in which grounds for actual arrest are lacking. If there are
grounds for arrest, then it would seem clear that the suspect might be
detained in a manner which does not include all the attributes of the
usual arrest, as long as he is not denied any of the protections available
to arrestees. However, admittedly some courts would probably have
difficulty with such a situation, as notwithstanding the presence of
grounds for arrest and the actual detention, a lack of booking, for
example, might influence a finding of illegality. Yet, if the police re-
frain from formal arrest when an arrest could legally be made in order
to allow the suspect to exculpate himself before his possible responsi-
bility for the offense can be publicized, then the police have acted for
the suspect's benefit and should not be charged with illegality. 10
Putting that situation aside, the inquiry here is whether the police
might ever briefly detain a suspect at headquarters when the suspect
cannot be arrested, the basis of detention being that the imposition on
the suspect is less than an actual, formal arrest. This question has
received even less consideration from the courts than that concerning
field interrogation. As in the case of on-the-street questioning, if the
practice ever reaches a court of law, either in a false imprisonment
108. In De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 1960) the court said
that any attempt to draw a distinction between the "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve" needed for arrest and the "reasonable grounds to suspect" test of the Act
would be "a semantic quibble."
109. Remington, supra note 97, at 392.
110. This is not just an abstract proposition. Consider the case of a man
suspected of a sexual assault against a minor. The child gives the name of
a man living in the same building. Her story seems plausible to the police for
the man had access to the child. Clearly, the police at that point would have
a sufficiency of evidence to arrest the man formally and bring him before a
magistrate for arraignment. Clearly also, the newspapers would have the
right to state that the man had been arrested for a sexual attack. His
friends, his business associates, his neighbors would be made aware of the
charge by the publicity and the police activity and forever after he would
have a record for having been arrested for a sexual crime.
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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action or an attempt to suppress evidence obtained incident to the
detention, the usual approach is to view the police action as an arrest
and then inquire whether grounds for the arrest were present.",-
No case has reached the appellate courts under the Uniform Arrest
Act in which the two-hour detention was on grounds insufficient for
arrest. 12 Indeed, it is far from clear that the Uniform Act contem-
plates detention at the station on grounds insufficient for arrest. It
must be remembered that the Act does not allow at-the-station deten-
tion on "reasonable ground to suspect," but only in those cases where
in addition to these grounds (which were the basis for the field inter-
rogation) the suspect has failed to identify himself or explain his
actions satisfactorily. An arrest in such a case might well be legal
without resort to the language of the Act. While refusal to answer a
question by a police officer does not in itself furnish grounds for ar-
rest,1 3 and while some courts have asserted that "no adverse inference
may be drawn" from a refusal to answer,1 4 the majority view seems
to be that it is appropriate to consider the refusal along with other
111. And, as with field interrogation, there has been a tendency to either say
that if the detention is not an arrest it is legal or that the detention must be con-
sidered an arrest in order to allow suit for its abuse. The former approach is
found in United States v. Bonanno, supra note 110, at 77, wherein it is said,
"It is axiomatic that before a finding can be made that there has been an illegal
arrest, a showing must be made that there has been an arrest." However, Judge
Kaufman later observes that to rely solely upon the fact no arrest was made, in
the common meaning of the word, would be to fall into a "semantic trap." Id.
at 78.
And, the other approach referred to above appears in Foote, supra note 95,
at 404, where Bonanno is criticized:
It is apparent, however, that such a construction is absurd, for inasmuch as
it makes the officer's intent the controlling factor, it would substitute the
policeman for the court and law as a protector of liberty. Seizures or arrests
without probable cause would be illegal only if the officer ultimately entered
a formal charge of crime on insufficient evidence....
112. In De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d 244 (Del. 1960), the only case found,
it seems clear that there were adequate grounds for arrest notwithstanding the
reliance by the police on the language of the Act.
113. State v. Gibbs, 252 Wis. 227, 31 N.W.2d 143 (1948).
114. Poulas v. United States, 95 F.2d 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1938).
Some courts apparently support the right of police to stop and question on the
supposition that refusal to answer cannot in any way adversely affect the suspect.
For example, in United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 86 n.21 (1960), the
court said:
It must be borne in mind that the defendants in this case had a constitu-
tional right to remain silent when questioned by police or other investigatory
agents or bodies, but they chose not to do so. Had they chosen such a course,
they would have suffered no penalty.
See also the dicta in Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1960).
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evidence. 15 Interestingly enough, the few courts that have recently
been asserting a police right to detain for questioning were those faced
with the task of dealing with the exclusionary effects of the Mallory
rule. 18
Notwithstanding this lack of attention to the problem, the observed
practice makes it clear that brief at-the-station detentions, not re-
garded or reported as arrests, sometimes occur. The officer may bring
the suspect to the station, absent grounds for arrest, because he feels
that his suspicions can be resolved by a short investigation. It may
be contemplated that the station officer or a detective will question the
suspect briefly, that a quick records check or analysis of physical evi-
dence can thus be accomplished or that the suspect will be viewed by a
witness known to be at hand. The validity of any such practice would
seem to depend in part upon whether the effects of such a detention
are sufficiently less severe than those of an actual arrest.
One difference, at least under the Uniform Arrest Act approach,
would be that the detention would be for a limited period, no longer
than a few hours, while police custody after an actual arrest might
continue for a day or two when evidence sufficient for charging is
being sought. To some, however, this would not be considered a real
difference, the reasoning being that all restraints, regardless of their
length, must initially be justified by the same quantum of evidence."1
A convincing argument can be made that even brief detention at the
station, unlike on-the-street questioning, is substantially like custody
after actual arrest, as it makes possible similar investigative methods
-detailed search, questioning of unreasonable intensity, and inter-
rogation behind closed doors."18 The contrary position, that even brief
interrogation is a significantly lesser imposition than actual arrest,
might be more convincing if it were clear suspects are informed at
the outset that they will be released within the hour if additional evi-
dence justifying arrest is not then at hand.
The fact that the detention is not called an arrest does not of itself
115. Dickerson v. United States, 120 A.2d 588 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1956); People
v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); People v. Romero, 156 Cal. App. 2d
48, 318 P.2d 835 (2d Dist. Ct. 1957); Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac.
43 (2d Dist. Ct. 1908); Baines v. Brady, 122 Cal. App. Supp. 957, 265 P.2d 194
(Super. Ct. 1953); Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d
428 (1950).
116. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Since Mallory says there is no right
to arrest one who cannot be charged, this attempt to find a right to "detain" on
less evidence might be said to really be a move toward a result like that of the
Michigan and Wisconsin courts, although slightly different terminology is used.
117. Foote, supra note 95, at 404; Foote, supra note 103, at 37-38.
118. This argument is well stated in Foote, supra note 103, at 38.
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seem to be an actual basis for distinction. This is conceded by both
proponents11 9 and opponents 120 of non-arrest detention. However, the
fact that the detention is not recorded as an arrest may be of some im-
portance. Again some would argue that this fact is "irrelevant,'
21
but it seems clear that a detention which results in the person detained
obtaining an arrest record is more severe than one which does not.
1 21
a
Of course, whether this distinction, along with any others, is sufficient
to justify the practice is another matter.
It also may be important whether the suspect regards the detention
as an arrest. Judge Kaufman, in United States v. Bonanno,"2 2 was of
the opinion that "a layman, if asked if he had even [sic] been arrested,
would not be likely to describe . . . even situations where his ques-
tioning had been continued at a police station .... ,,123 It is not entirely
clear that this is so. As with field interrogation, it may be of consider-
able importance whether the person investigated will still be able to
respond in the negative when asked whether he has ever been arrested.
However, if questionnaires should be revised so as to inquire whether
the person has been "arrested or detained," the distinction may lose
its importance.124
Finally, it may be of considerable significance how compulsory de-
tention at a police station affects one's reputation. It has been sug-
gested that the stigma is equivalent to that of an actual arrest:
119. Thus, an immediate problem of definition arises. Joined to that problem,
is the danger, that the defining process will cast an air of deceptive sim-
plicity over the broader task actually faced by the Court. One must never
forget that this is a decision on the rights of individuals and the duties of
government, and not an abstract exercise in definition.
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
120. Foote, supra note 95, at 403.
121. Foote, supra note 95, at 403; Foote, supra note 103, at 37-38.
121a. However, here again it would be important to consider the permanency
of arrest records. See note 104 supra.
122. 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
123. Id. at 78.
124. The Application for Federal Employment Standard Form 57 (Revised
May 1954) asked: Have you ever been arrested, charged, or held by Federal,
State, or other law-enforcement authorities for any violation of any Federal
law, State law, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance?
The newer form 57 (revised March 1961) inquires: Have you ever been arrested,
taken into custody, held for investigation or questioning or charged by any law
enforcement authority?
In 22 CALiF. Ass'y INTERIM COMM. RPTs. 1959-61, no. 1, Report on Ass' Y
Interim Comm. on Crim. Proc. 57 (1961), it is noted that the employment applica-
tion form used by the state personnel board asks: "Have you as a juvenile or
adult ever been detained by law enforcement officers, or arrested, or convicted of
any offense other than traffic violations?" The committee recommended that it be
made unlawful for any employment application form used by the state to ask
whether the applicant has ever been detained or arrested.
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The fact remains that . .. the [Uniform Arrest] Act does not
wholly eliminate the ignominy which results from a conventional
arrest and charge of crime. Inferences are bound to be drawn
against anyone who is taken to a police station against his will to
be investigated, and the attempt to minimize this stigma is more
apparent than real.125
This argument carries considerable weight, and it is here that the
at-the-station questioning may clearly be of greater consequence than
field interrogation. A conversation with a policeman on a street corner
is not as likely to be mistaken by the public as an arrest as is an actual
taking of the suspect to the station for further questioning.
Assuming for the moment that such a detention might be considered
a lesser imposition on the suspect, there may also be an inherent
danger in allowing unrecorded detention. While immediate booking
may in one sense operate to the disadvantage of the suspect-giving
him an arrest record, it nonetheless operates to his advantage in that
the detention becomes visible and thus less subject to abuse. Also, if
certain rights are afforded the suspect at the time of booking,121a it
would seem improper to deny such rights to the suspect held without
booking. To alleviate these difficulties, a distinctive kind of booking
might be employed in these cases, but it would then be even less
certain that such a detention is less severe than a regular arrest.12 b
By way of conclusion, it should be pointed out that beyond the kind
of analysis suggested above there exist issues of administrative feasi-
bility. The point is that a court or legislature might recognize a right
of field interrogation of those not subject to arrest, using the lesser
imposition analysis, but yet might for good reason decline to establish
any at-the-station detention other than arrest, notwithstanding a con-
clusion that a nonarrest detention would be less severe. It is true that
problems of definition should not dissuade us from attempting to re-
solve important issues.126 However, it may well be that any attempt
to establish three distinct probability of guilt standards for application
by the police and interpretation by the courts would result in detri-
ments to the system outweighing the supposed benefits from separate
125. Foote, supra note 103, at 37.
125a. In California a statute allowing a person to use the telephone "im-
mediately after he is booked" has been recently amended to read "immediately
after he is booked, and, except where physically impossible, no later than three
hours after his arrest." CALIF. PENAL CODE § 851.5 (Supp. 1961).
125b. We have previously noted that "suspicion of" booking is employed in
cases where further investigation is contemplated. Some police justified this
booking on the added ground that it had less of an impact on the suspect than
a booking "on the nose." For a similar view by a California district attorney, see
BAmRR, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50
CALIF. L. REv. 11, 27-28 n. 73 (1962).
126. Remington, supra note 97, at 392.
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recognition of three distinct law enforcement problems. In short, still
viewing the profile of the system as a series of steps it may be ad-
ministratively necessary to limit the number of expressly recognized
steps in the process.
2. "Voluntary" Custody
Closely related to the practice discussed above is the so-called "vol-
untary" appearance at the police station. From time to time the police,
suspecting a person of an offense but not having grounds for arrest,
"invite" or "request" the person to come to the police station in order
to facilitate further investigation. It is a fair statement that such a
situation was not frequently observed, especially as compared with
other police practices grounded on the supposed voluntary actions of
the suspect. However, the fact that the alleged voluntary appearance
has received little attention from the law would seem to warrant con-
sideration of the practice, even though it is true that the problem is a
minor one compared to the common practice of searching because of
supposed consent by the suspect. 127
Of course, if a person suspected of criminal conduct actually does
voluntarily agree to accompany an officer to the station in order to
exculpate himself, then the police can hardly be criticized for taking
advantage of this opportunity to advance their investigation. Indeed,
the police have sometimes been criticized for not employing this less
offensive device in checking out suspects. The only serious question
arising out of this practice, therefore, is that of determining when
these appearances are in fact voluntary.
Of the sparse legal treatment of this issue, the Wisconsin decision
of Gunderson v. Struebing128 is undoubtedly a leading case. A police
officer was informed by a merchant that a pair of gloves were taken
from his store while three customers were there. The officer ap-
proached one of three, and said, "I would like to see you down to the
station a minute." The suspect accompanied the officer to the station,
at which time the officer explained in detail the nature of his suspi-
cions, and the suspect then consented to a search of his person and
left when the gloves were not found. In holding that the trial court
erred in finding for the suspect-plaintiff as a matter of law, the court
said:
There was sufficient evidence to support an inference that
there was no array of force exhibited by the officer such as would
warrant, necessarily, the plaintiff in believing that if he did not
obey the invitation to go to the police station he would be arrested
or restrained of his liberty. ...
127. Because the police frequently attempt to justify searches on the basis of
supposed consent, it appears the courts are becoming more strict. See People v.
Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960).
128. 125 Wis. 173, 104 N.W. 149 (1905).
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If the officer, in the discharge of his duty, in good faith invited
plaintiff to the police station for the purpose of interrogating him
and investigating the charge, with a view of deciding upon future
action, and without any intention at that time of putting plaintiff
under arrest or restraint, no case was made by plaintiff . ...
Generally, the test set forth by the Wisconsin court seems sound.
The one objection which could be made is that something less than "an
array of force" may be sufficient to warrant the suspect in believing
he has no choice but to accompany the officer to the station. The officer
will have no occasion to threaten or use force unless the suspect shows
some signs of resistance. And, by analogy to the search cases, the
suspect should not be required to put up actual resistance in order to
later receive recognition of the fact that his rights have been vio-
lated.230
Indeed, the difficult cases are not those in which any degree of force
was exhibited by the officer. Rather, the situations observed in prac-
tice are those in which a person known to be a police officer speaks to
the suspect in a manner which could be interpreted as either a request
or a command. The statement made in Gunderson--"I would like to
see you down to the station a minute"-could be either, depending
upon how it was said. In such a situation, whether the suspect has
actually agreed to go to the station because he wants the opportunity
to clear himself or whether he has accompanied the officer because he
reasonably believes he has no choice is not an easy determination.
The officer who desires to protect himself from possible liability for
what he now views as a request, and who at the same time desires to
treat the suspect with fairness, might well be advised to fully warn the
suspect of the exact circumstances. That is, the suspect should be told
that under the circumstances he cannot be arrested,"'1 that he is under
no obligation to go to the station and that the investigation at the
station may either clear him or provide evidence justifying his con-
tinued detention. An absolute requirement of such a warning would
not be inconsistent with developments in the law in other areas where
the question of the voluntary nature of a criminal suspect's actions has
come into question. Whether a person from whom a statement has
been received was warned of his rights beforehand has always been an
important factor to be considered in determining the trustworthiness
of the confession. 132 However, more recent decisions have suggested
129. Id. at 176-77, 104 N.W. at 150.
130. Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368 (1943); Dade v.
State, 188 Okla. 677, 112 P.2d 1102 (1941) ; State v. Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, 198
N.W. 854 (1924).
131. That is, assuming this is so. Obtaining a voluntary appearance has been
recommended even when the officer has grounds for arrest. PERKINS, ELEMENTS
OF POLICE SCIENCE 302 (1942).
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that the failure to warn the suspect might in itself render the state-
ment inadmissible. 13 3 Likewise, while earlier cases have found the
fact of warning significant in finding a search to be with consent, there
is now evidence of a move toward requiring such a warning before the
evidence can be found admissible.134 The only conceivable objection to
requiring such a warning would seem to be the fear that having to
prove the warning would merely inject a side issue into the trial of a
criminal case.235
3. Arrest for Another Offense
There is yet another way in which custody of a suspect may be
obtained notwithstanding the lack of sufficient grounds to make an
arrest for the offense suspected. That is by making an arrest for an-
other lesser offense committed by the suspect. With the arrest pre-
sumably validated by the grounds for arrest on the other offense, the
suspected offense can be investigated during the period the suspect is
awaiting trial on the other offense or even while he is serving out a
short sentence for this lesser offense.
Of course, if there are not even sufficient grounds for arrest on the
lesser offense, then the practice is obviously illegal. Such instances
were occasionally observed. However, the more frequent occurrence,
and that raising more difficult issues, is the arrest for a lesser offense
on sufficient evidence but motivated by the desire to investigate an-
other, more serious crime.
Often the suspicious conduct of the person which creates the desire
for investigation is itself a violation of the law. Sometimes it appears
that by the adoption of certain provisions, the legislatures have in-
tended to give the police power to arrest for a minor offense such as
vagrancy or disorderly conduct when there is general suspicion relat-
132. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), where the failure to warn
the suspect he could remain silent along with other factors resulted in the con-
fession being barred, and Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Ash-
down v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958), where the giving of such a warning was a
factor considered by the court in upholding the admissibility of the confession.
133. E.g., "A confession is inadmissible unless accused was advised of his
rights under the law and it is shown the confession was made voluntarily." State
v. Seward, 163 Kan. 136, 144, 181 P.2d 478, 484 (1947) (dicta).
134. E.g., People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960).
135. Such an objection has been voiced with respect to the proposal to require
warning before confessions are received. Statement of Judge Holtzoff, Hearings
#1, at 8.
A similar problem can arise as to the so-called "voluntary" custody. See United
States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), where the detention is upheld on the
basis that it was voluntary. The opinion relates that there was a substantial
difference in the testimony of the defendant and the F.B.I. agents as to what was
said before the defendant accompanied them to headquarters.
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ing to other criminal conduct.1 6 Thus, the statutes cover one "found
loitering without visible means of support"'1 7 or "found in or loitering
near any structure, vehicle or private grounds . . . without the con-
136. "The underlying purpose [of the vagrancy laws] is to relieve the police
of the necessity of proving that criminals have committed or are planning to
commit specific crimes." N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report 591 (1935). The
police stressed this same point in testimony to the Congress prior to congressional
revision of the District of Columbia vagrancy provision. H.R. REP. No. 1248, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941).
Also interesting on this point of legislative cognizance of the use of these pro-
visions to investigate and arrest suspicious persons is the California experience.
A modern disorderly conduct statute was drafted eliminating anything comparable
to the then existing vagrancy provisions defining as a vagrant "every person who
roams about from place to place without any lawful business . . ." and "every
person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night, with-
out any visible or lawful business. . . ." CAL. PEN. CODE § 647 (Deering 1949).
Governor Brown vetoed the bill, giving the following explanation:
The bill proposed to repeal subdivisions 3 and 6 [those quoted above] of the
present law without substituting any kind of control over those whose con-
duct afforded occasion for legitimate suspicion. I am aware that police actionin this regard has led to criticism, and I agree that the present law should
be revised. But I do not think that the possibility of abuse justifies com-
pletely denying any controls at all. Legislation in this area would be effec-
tive if it gave some definition of authority and obligation to which the private
citizen and the policeman could reasonably and fairly conform.
The draftsman then suggested an amended bill which would include in the defini-
tion of disorderly persons one "Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from
place to place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so
to do."
See Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Re-
vision, 48 CAIF. L. REv. 557-73, 562 n.38, 568-69, 569 n. 67, 571 n.73 (1960).
This language with the qualifying phrase "if the surrounding circumstances
are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
identification," was adopted. CALIF. PENAL CODE § 647 (Supp. 1961).
How a legislature might be considering procedural problems when drafting
such substantive legislation is also demonstrated by the comments to the Model
Penal Code provision on "suspicious loitering":
The proposals here made to penalize what might be called "suspicious loiter-
ing," are all that would be left in the law of that ancient protean offense
dtesifnated "vagrancy," if indeed even this much should be retained in a code
of substantive penal law. The reasons for doubt on that score are that a
statute which makes it a penal offense for a person to fail to identify himself
and give an exculpatory account of his presence is in effect an extension of
the law of arrest, and trenches on the privilege against self-incrimination. It
authorizes arrest of persons who have not given reasonable ground for be-
lieving that they are engaged in or have committed offenses. Alternatively,
it can be regarded as a legislative determination that in "suspicious" circum-
stances, failure to respond to police inquiries supplies reasonable ground. In
either view, extension of the law of arrest might be regarded as a matter for
a code of procedure rather than an end to be achieved indirectly by creating
a substantive offense of failure to respond to the police.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
137. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-2409 (1949).
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sent of the owner and . . . unable to account for his presence." 188
Where state legislation is lacking, which is unusual, 1 such suspicious
conduct may be covered by local ordinances. 40
Clearly a number of these provisions are of doubtful constitution-
ality. Defining the offense in terms of reputation is highly question-
able,14 1 as is defining it in terms of association.142 Even the provisions
concerning failure to account may have to be narrowly construed in
order to be held constitutional."'4 Yet most of these statutes and
ordinances have not been subjected to serious constitutional challenge.
And, because of the attitude that these statutes provide a necessary
basis for the detention and investigation of suspicious characters, no
attempt is made at reform of these provisions by the legislatures.14
The police do not attempt to fully enforce these provisions, but instead
limit their application to those persons they in fact desire to investi-
gate. Other minor offenses, not in themselves based upon suspicious
conduct but yet not normally enforced, are sometimes employed for
the same purpose. 4 5
138. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.02 (1958).
139. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 603 (1956); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66
HAnv. L. REv. 1203 (1953); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS LJ. 237
(1958); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (1960); Comment, Who Is a Vagrant in California,
23 CALIF. L. REv. 506 (1935); Comment, Police Controls over Citizen Use of the
Public Streets, 49 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 562 (1959); Comment, The Constitution-
ality of Loitering Ordinances, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 247 (1960); Note, Use of
Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE
L.J. 1351 (1950).
140. E.g., CITY OF DETRoIT COMP. ORDINANCES ch. 223, § 1 (1954).
141. People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520 (1933). See generally
Lacey, supra note 139.
142. People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934) ; Hechinger v. City
of Maysville, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 486, 57 S.W. 619 (Ct. App. 1900); EX parte Smith,
135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896) ; see Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1228, 1230 (1934).
143. A Denver ordinance provided that one "who is found abroad at late or
unusual hours of the night without any visible or lawful business" may be re-
quired to give "a satisfactory account of himself" or be deemed a vagrant. Inter-
preting the ordinance in such a way as to be consistent with constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court of Colorado held that it did not apply to a person "conducting
himself in such manner as not to give reasonable grounds for belief that his
purpose . . . is an unlawful one. . . ." Dominguez v. Denver, 363 P.2d 661, 665
(Colo. 1961). The phrase "without a lawful business," according to the court,
means "that his conduct or the circumstances of his presence constitute an offense
or the suggestion of an intent to commit an offense." (Ibid.)
144. For the interesting California experience, see note 136 supra.
145. There are a host of criminal statutes which do not receive full enforce-
ment. See LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law--Part I, 1962
Wis. L. REv. 104, Part II, id. at 179.
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If the propriety of police conduct in the kind of case just described
were to be questioned, it might be asked: Is it proper for the police to
arrest for a minor offense in order to conduct an in-custody investiga-
tion concerning a more serious offense when there is not sufficient
evidence to arrest for the more serious crime and when, absent the
desire for investigation, no arrest would have been made? This kind
of question has seldom reached the appellate courts.
An exception is a California case in which the testimony of the
arresting officers frankly revealed that the vagrant would not have
been arrested except for the desire to investigate. Said the court:
Whether this is an entirely commendable attitude towards appel-
lant's class of misdemeanants we need not stop to consider, but we
'think the admitted fact that the appellant would not have been
arrested if he had confined himself to vagrancy did not render his
arrest for that offense illegal. 1 4
In sharp contrast is the following attitude of an English court:
It seems to me to be an abuse of the process of the criminal law
to use the purely formal charge of a trifling offense upon which
there is no real intention to proceed, as a cover for putting the
person charged under arrest, and obtaining from that person in-
criminating statements, not in relation to the charge laid
but in relation to a more serious and altogether different of-fense.. 147
In support of the practice, it might be said that the substantive
offense was probably adopted by the legislature for exactly such a
purpose. :1 48 While the commentators are not in agreement on the
146. People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 47, 91 Pac. 997, 1000 (1907).
147. Rex v. Dick, [1947] Ont. 105, 695, 2 D.L.R. 213, 225, quoted in Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). In Dick the judge used his discretionary power
to exclude from evidence the statements made by the prisoner who had been
charged with vagrancy, cautioned concerning that offense (or not at all) and then
questioned with the purpose of eliciting information about the murder of which
she was suspected.
148. See note 136 supra. Probably best suited to this purpose, however, is not
the usual vagrancy statute, but provisions like that recommended but not adopted
in Wisconsin (declaring as a vagrant "a person who loiters on the streets, whose
actions give rise to suspicion of wrongdoing and who is unable to give a satis-
factory account of himself") or like that found in the Model Penal Code ("A
person who loiters or wanders without apparent reason or business in a place or
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances which
justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime commits a
violation if he refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and
give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes.")
5 Wis. Legis. Council, Judiciary Comm. Report on Criminal Code 210 (1953);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
However, the most common judicial explanation of vagrancy's place in a penal
code is that it is used in cases of suspected future criminality, rather than past
criminality. Yet many of the appellate cases disclose that the latter purpose was
the real reason for the arrest. See Foote, supra note 139, at 625, 628-29.
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legitimacy of such a purpose,149 probably the most valid criticism made
is that questioning the appropriateness of adopting substantive pro-
vizions to solve procedural problems. One writer on the subject says:
If it is necessary to . . . legalize arrests for mere suspicion, then
the grave policy and constitutional problems posed by such sug-
gestions should be faced. If present restrictions on the laws of
attempts or arrest place too onerous a burden upon the police be-
cause of the nature of modern crime, then such propositions
should be discussed and resolved on their merits, as, for example,
the proposals in the Uniform Arrest Act.150
In short, the issue is whether these statutes and ordinances are the
most appropriate way of dealing with the suspicious person problem,
considering all the alternatives available.'15
Of course, in those cases in which the police do not make an arrest
for vagrancy or disorderly conduct or under some other suspicious con-
duct type statute, but for some other lesser offense which does not
receive full enforcement, the problem takes on a slightly different
complexion. Here the complaint is not against the form of the statute
itself, as it does not proscribe suspicious conduct nor was it likely
passed for the purpose of aiding the police in this fashion. The fact
that a given statute might be used for this purpose does not seem a
persuasive basis for repeal of the provision, any more than would the
149. E.g., compare: "Arrest of a person who is not known to have committed a
crime simply to discover whether he might possibly have done so someplace ...
is clearly unjustifiable." Comment, 23 CALi. L. REV. 506 (1935), with:
If a crime is specified for which the officer has power to arrest on reason-
able suspicion, the mere fact that the person arrested is subsequently charged
with a different crime does not make the arrest wrongful, for non constat
that the officer did not reasonably believe that the stated crime had been
committed when he made the arrest .... So it seems that an otherwise
valid arrest on a minor charg is not rendered illegal by the fact that the
real or principal motive of the police is to prevent the suspect's escaping
from justice on some major charge which they are preparing against him
.... This means that there is no legal objection to the practice of making
a "holding charge," provided of course that the holding charge is a genuine
one and that it operates to justify the detention.
Williams, Requisites of a Valid Arrest, [1954] CRim. L. REV. (Eng.) 6, 17.
150. Foote, supra note 139, at 649. A similar position is taken in Note, Use
of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE
L.J. 1351 (1950).
151. The various alternatives are set forth in the Model Penal Code comments,
and the difficulties of each of the alternatives are also discussed there. In brief,
the alternatives are (1) making the suspicions a criminal offense; (2) making
suspicions the basis for police inquiry to which the actor must respond (the Code
position); (3) making suspicions the basis for a brief detention period (the
Uniform Arrest Act position) ; (4) allowing the police to order suspicious persons
to "move on"; or (5) allow the police to merely make inquiries, with a view to
having the person's identity established if it is later learned an offense has been
committed. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, comments (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
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possibility that the statute is susceptible to selective enforcement.1 2
If the practice is to be controlled, it would mean that the motive of
the officer making the arrest would have to be determined, which
usually will not be an easy task.
4. Arrest for Probation or Parole Violation
A somewhat similar device which has been used to justify the arrest
of a person suspected of an offense is the "probation hold" or the
"parolee hold." Although it can be used only against suspects having
either probationer or parolee status, it sometimes serves as a basis for
arrest when the police do not have sufficient evidence to make an arrest
for the new offense to be investigated. The "hold" is merely another
kind of booking, and indicates that the person in custody is being de-
tained for the probation or parole authorities.
The exact legal status of these "holds" is not clear. This is so be-
cause the law on the rights, duties and privileges of probationers and
parolees is clouded with ambiguity. Statutes seldom deal specifically
with these problems, though authority for the "hold" might be found
in legislation declaring that parolees and probationers remain in the
"legal custody" of the state authorities.1 53 Case law has not developed
for the simple reason that the tenuous position of the probationer or
parolee makes him hesitant to attempt to establish the fact of police
illegality.
Yet, even assuming that a "hold" may be properly employed, it
would nonetheless seem unlikely that it may be used for purposes other
than those directly relating to the determination of the question of
revocation. For this reason, the basic issue involved is not unlike
that discussed with regard to arrest for a lesser offense for purposes
of investigation. Is the use of the "hold" proper, even assuming it is
otherwise legal, when it is employed for the sole reason of allowing
the police to take custody in order to investigate another offense?
While it might be said that this issue can be answered in much the
same way as in the vagrancy arrest situation, the situation here is
admittedly more complex. Here the basis for the arrest and the mo-
tives of the officer are not completely separable, as it might well be
152. On the fallacy of arguing for repeal of a provision (or for exclusion from
a proposed code) because of the possibility of selective enforcement, see Remington
and Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.P.
481, 493-94. For a criticism of this view, see Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion
in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 911-12 (1962).
153. In Michigan it is expressly stated that a person on parole is in the legal
custody of the commission, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.2308(38) (1954), but no
similar statutory language as to probationers has been found. In Wisconsin both
probationers and parolees remain in the legal custody of the department of public
welfare. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 57.02, .06 (1957).
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contended that investigation of the new offense suspected is directly
relevant to the determination of the revocation question.
C. CONTINUED CUSTODY OF A PERSON WHO CAN BE CHARGED
If there is sufficient evidence available to allow the prosecutor to
charge the suspect with an offense, then obviously further detention to
enable charging is not necessary. However, if invocation of the process
against this person is to be successful it will later be necessary to
establish his guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." Some would argue
that further detention of the person who can be charged is necessary
in order to allow for the obtaining of the additional evidence required.
If the suspect can be charged, there may also be reasons for desiring
in-custody investigation unrelated to the gathering of additional evi-
dence on the commission of this offense by this offender. In the course
of investigating the principal offense, the police may have come to
suspect that the offender is also responsible for other offenses as well,
and may now desire to conduct further inquiries in this regard. Or,
the nature of the suspect's offense may suggest either that he acted
with accomplices or that he of necessity had contact with other of-
fenders. If so, continued custody may be desired in hopes of learning
their identity.
1. Custody to Obtain Evidence Sufficient for Conviction
Should the police be entitled to retain custody of a suspect who can
be charged, in order to obtain additional evidence sufficient for con-
viction? Such a practice was sometimes observed, although specific
authority for such a procedure is lacking in those jurisdictions.5' The
need of the police to "wrap up the case" by obtaining that evidence
necessary to insure conviction has been used as a basis for objecting
to the Mallory rule.15 5 And, at least some courts appear to view in-
custody investigation for this purpose to be proper. 56
In discussing earlier the possibility of custody being justified on the
basis that the police were expeditiously attempting to obtain evidence
sufficient for charging, it was noted that an acknowledgment of the
validity of such detention could not be expected from all courts. The
154. Admittedly the courts in Michigan and Wisconsin, in allowing post-arrest
detention for investigation, have not made it absolutely clear that the investigation
is limited to obtaining evidence sufficient to charge. But, see language quoted in
the text at notes 71, 75, 77 and 79. On the uncertainty in Wisconsin, see Note,
1960 WIS. L. REv. 164, 167.
155. Coakley, Restictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 2 (1957);
Statement of Oliver Gasch, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
in Hearings # 2, at 22.
156. E.g., People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281, 89 N.E.2d 27 (1949).
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reason is that if, as in Mallory, it is denied that the grounds for arrest
and for charging are distinguishable, then any admission that grounds
for charging are being sought is an admission of an illegal arrest.
A contention that grounds for conviction are being sought would
not be subjected to the same analysis by any court. All would agree
that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test required for conviction is
more demanding than the test of a valid arrest. The validity of the
arrest in such a case would require independent inquiry, and the only
basis for automatic disapproval of the detention would be that the
added evidence required is not to be obtained by continuing the custody
of the suspect.
The difference between the two situations cannot be over-empha-
sized. It is one thing to say that after a person has been taken into
custody a brief period of investigation might be allowed where neces-
sary to enable the prosecuting authorities to decide whether to charge
or release; it is another to contend that the detention should continue
while evidence sufficient to insure the suspect's conviction is gathered.
A court might well approve the former and condemn the latter.
Because detention of the suspect who cannot be charged has been
discussed earlier, it is desirable at this point to determine in what
respects the practice presently under consideration might be said to
require different treatment. As with all the other detention situations
which have been discussed, the basic task is that of reaching a fair
compromise between the conflicting values of individual freedom and
effective law enforcement. With that task in mind, the principal bases
for drawing a distinction between detention of the person who cannot
be charged and the person who can would appear to be: (1) the possi-
bility that the needs of in-custody investigation are not as great once
it is determined the person can be charged, and (2) the possibility
that the fact the person has become an accused, rather than a suspect,
requires cloaking him with added protections from official inquiry.
As to the first of these, it could be argued that the investigatory
job of the police is less difficult once sufficient evidence is at hand to
charge the suspect. When the suspect cannot be charged, immediate
in-custody investigation may be of significant importance. Time is
needed to learn the true identity of the suspect who will not identify
himself, but who resembles a wanted person; to check the serial num-
bers on a bankroll flashed by a well-known hoodlum; to determine
whether a break-in has occurred in the area where the suspect was
found lurking; to confront the suspect with his accuser; to check the
stolen property file on an expensive ring worn by a known burglar; to
compare the suspect's fingerprints or shoe prints with those found at a
crime scene; to determine whether the suspect's alibi is false; to hold
a showup so that the victim can view the suspect or suspects found
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who fit the general description; to administer a handwriting test, a
drunkometer test, or a thorough search; to watch for withdrawal
symptoms on the one-time addict found with fresh scars; to question
the unemployed man carrying a toy gun and large sum of money about
recent unsolved holdups; and for chemical analysis of a powder which
appears to be narcotics.
In all the above situations, and in many more similar situations, no
prosecutor would or should charge the suspect with a crime until the
appropriate investigation has provided the necessary nexus between
the suspect and a particular offense. As the examples illustrate, with-
out the investigation it may not be clear that any crime has been
committed, that the suspect has been connected with any particular
outstanding offense or that the suspect has been found more probably
guilty of a particular offense than other suspects. Without the in-
vestigation there does not exist that evidence necessary to proceed to
prosecution, as "probable cause" requires that "the evidence worthy
of consideration, in any aspect for the judicial mind to act upon, brings
the charge against the prisoner within the reasonable probabilities.'9 15?
Yet, in most of the above situations the investigation which results
in evidence sufficient for charging will not insure conviction. The
traced stolen property, the accusation repeated face to face, the alibi
proven false and many other fruitful results of in-custody investiga-
tion may establish the guilt of the suspect "within the reasonable prob-
abilities," but not "beyond a reasonable doubt." As the conviction test
suggests, the prosecution must be prepared to put in sufficient evi-
dence so that when the triers of fact engage in the self-analysis needed
to determine their degree of persuasion they will conclude "that there
is no reasonable explanation of the facts proven except upon the hy-
pothesis that the accused committed the crime charged . ... ,158
Now, the question which cannot be answered with any certainty is
whether the investigation needed to get from the charging standard
to the conviction standard really necessitates the further custody of the
accused. Custody to reach the charging decision may be explained by
the necessity to determine whether any crime has been committed,
whether the suspect can be connected with any outstanding offense or
whether any one suspect is more probably guilty than some others.
But, if the person now can be charged, it usually has been conclusively
determined that a crime has in fact been committed. 5 9 And it has been
157. State ex rel. Wojtyceski v. Hanley, 248 Wis. 108, 111, 20 N.W.2d 719, 720
(1945).
158. Emery v. State, 92 Wis. 146, 151, 65 N.W. 848, 850 (1896). See 9 WIG-
MoRE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940) ; M Baine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242 (1944).
159. Indeed, some states require that at the preliminary it be established that
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established that the suspect has probably committed it. What remains
is the task of "filling the gaps," the job of eliminating other reasonable
explanations of the evidence against the accused. With the crime and
the probable guilt of the accused established, it may well be that this
remaining investigation does not pose the kind of difficulties present
in pre-charging investigation, and that for this reason a fair balanc-
ing of the conflicting interests does not require a further right of de-
tention of the accused.
A second reason for possibly viewing investigation of one who can-
not be charged and one who can be charged in a different light is the
very fact that the status of the individual has changed from that of
"suspect" to "accused." As Lord Justice Devlin has pointed out, this
distinction is viewed to be a most important one in England:
The inquiry that is conducted by the police divides itself natu-
rally into two parts, which are recognizably different, although
it is difficult to say at just what point the first part ends and the
second begins. In the earlier part the object of the inquiry is to
ascertain the guilty party and in the latter part it is to prove the
case against him. The distinction between the two periods is in
effect the distinction between suspicion and accusation. The mo-
ment at which the suspect becomes the accused marks the change.
The first phase of the inquiry is in England accepted as belong-
ing solely to the administrative process. It has not been subjected
to any form of judicial restraint. On the contrary the freedom of
the police has been judicially declared ...
The second phase of the inquiry begins when the suspect be-
comes the accused. If thereafter questions are asked of the ac-
cused, the main object must be to obtain proof against him by
means of admissions. This makes it a proper subject for judicial
restraint ...
What test is employed to decide the moment when the suspect
becomes the accused? If the first part of the inquiry were simply
a matter of selecting the right person from a number of suspects,
the dividing line would be easy to draw. But . . . that is rarely
the case. When, for example, a man has been assaulted or a
woman raped, the individual alleged to be the criminal is often
identified, and then there is no question of charging anyone except
him. But the police cannot charge him until they have reasonable
grounds for thinking not only that he committed the act alleged
but also that he was guilty of the crime. The first interview with
him must almost inevitably be begun on the footing that he is still
a suspect; admitting that he was the person involved, he may say
in the case of rape that the woman consented or in the case of an
assault that he was acting in self-defense. It then becomes the
"the offense charged had been committed, and that there was probable cause to
believe that the defendants were guilty." People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 609,
60 N.W.2d 472, 482 (1953). While usually this is no problem, it can be in cases
involving negligent homicide, obscene literature, and the like, where the only
question in the case is whether any crime has been committed.
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task of the police to check his statements, and when they are doing
that they are engaged in the twofold task of ascertaining whether
he is guilty and of collecting the evidence which, if he is charged,
will be used to prove his guilt. In such a case it is hard to know
where to draw the line, but nevertheless there will be a point when
the police become sufficiently convinced of his guilt that their sub-
sequent inquiries are directed toward acquiring legal proof of that
which they already believe.160
Once the "suspect" becomes an "accused" in England, he immediately
gains added rights.161
The accused-suspect distinction was also viewed as being of great
importance by four justices of the Supreme Court in Spano v. New
York .16 2 They would hold that a constitutional right to counsel arises
when the person in custody is an "accused" rather than a mere "sus-
pect." Though Spano was concerned with a person who was indicted
prior to arrest, they saw a right of counsel arising because the person
had been "formally charged" and because it was not a case "where
the police were questioning a suspect in the course of investigating an
unsolved crime." Such an approach is now followed in New York.163
Although the above references to the distinction concern questions
of when a warning must be given and when counsel must be allowed
into the case, the rationale behind these positions might well be ap-
plicable to the issue of police detention. Once the suspect becomes an
accused, there is a "declaration of war," as Justice Devlin puts it, and
"the police ...are no longer representing themselves to the man
they are questioning as the neutral inquirer whom the good citizen
ought to assist," rather they now "are the prosecution and are without
right, legal or moral, to further help from the accused .. ."6'4 This
160. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 31, 33-34 (1958).
161. At that point, under the Judges' Rules, the accused must be cautioned that
he need not say anything and that any statement made will be taken down and
may be used in evidence. The Rules are reproduced and discussed in detail in
DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 160.
Proponents of Mallory sometimes cite the English system as proof that law
enforcement is not hampered by requiring arrest only on grounds for charging
and by denying a right to interrogate those in custody. However, close observers
of the English system point out that such is not the practice. Smith, Questioning
by the Police: Some Further Points- I [1960] CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 347; Wil-
liams, Arrest for Felony at Common Law, [1954] CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 408;
Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations, [1960] CRIM.
L. REV. (Eng.) 325; Memorandum by Street in Hearings # 1, at 13.
162. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
163. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825 (1960). For a careful
study of the growth of the New York rule out of the Spano case, see Rothblatt
and Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraign-
ment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24 (1960).
164. DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 160, at 37.
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being so, the added need for protection of an accused may itself war-
rant bringing police detention to a close at that point.
Assuming for the moment that detention of one who can be charged
is improper, a few practices related to those described earlier must be
commented on briefly. It was noted in the prior discussion that police
sometimes obtain custody absent grounds for arrest by either making
an arrest for a lesser offense committed, such as vagrancy, or by use
of the probation or parolee "hold." These same tactics have sometimes
been employed where evidence sufficient for arrest (or perhaps even
sufficient for charging) was available, in order that the detention
might be continued while evidence sufficient for conviction is sought.
The "hold" has made it possible for the police to continue custody for
ten days. In the vagrancy situation, the suspect may be convicted and
given a ten-day sentence, or the judge may continue the case for that
period at the request of the prosecution.
As with the situation discussed earlier, it might be said that if
there are grounds for conviction of the lesser offense or if there is a
basis for revocation of probation or parole, then the motive is irrele-
vant. A contrary position, however, is reflected in a recent Supreme
Court decision. A suspect was arrested for questioning in the case of
a double murder-robbery which took place unwitnessed. The arrest
was made Saturday night; on Monday morning the suspect was booked
for breach of the peace and on Tuesday morning he was taken into
police court on this charge. At the suggestion of the investigating
officer, the prosecutor moved for a continuance, which was granted
without the defendant having an opportunity to contest the motion or
participate in the proceedings in any way. Said Justices Frankfurter
and Stewart of this procedure:
Instead of bringing him before a magistrate with reasonable
promptness, as Connecticut law requires, to be duly represented
for the grave crimes of which he was in fact suspected (and for
which he had been arrested under the felony-arrest statute), he
was taken before the New Britain Police Court on the palpable
ruse of a breach-of-the-peace charge concocted to give the police
time to pursue their investigation. This device is admitted. ...
[I]t kept Culombe in police hands without any of the protections
that a proper magistrate's hearing would have assured him. Cer-
tainly, had he been brought before it charged with murder in-
stead of an insignificant misdemeanor, no court would have failed
to warn Culombe of his rights and arrange for appointment of
counsel.1 65
Their reasoning is most interesting, as it would seem to apply
even though the charge on which the suspect is actually taken into
court is fully substantiated, and even though the person's detention is
165. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631-32 (1961).
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brought about by actual conviction. The point of it is that whatever
other legal reasons might exist for detention, if it is used for investi-
gative purposes it must include the protections ordinarily available to
one arrested and detained for the offense being investigated.
2. Custody to Investigate Other Offenses
It was frequently observed that persons were not immediately sent
through the charging and appearance process, although there was
sufficient evidence to do so, because the police desired to question these
persons while they were still in custody concerning offenses other than
that for which they were apprehended. Since initial appearance would
result in the possibility of the suspect making bail, it is thought neces-
sary to conduct this investigation prior to this time. Questioning con-
cerning other offenses is usually considered appropriate when the
offense for which the arrest was made suggests that the offender has
in the past committed other like offenses, or when it makes the of-
fender suspect with regard to some other crime of a greater magni-
tude.166
When a person is arrested for an offense such as breaking and
entering or robbery, it is usually presumed to be likely that this same
person has also been responsible for similar such offenses in the past.
Because there usually are a great number of these crimes as yet un-
solved, an attempt is made to determine whether any of them are
attributable to this particular arrestee. Interrogation, either by pre-
cinct detectives or by personnel of specialized agencies, is the investi-
gation technique most often employed.8 7 The usual approach is for
166. It would be well to note that we are not here concerned with the arrest
for one offense for the specific purpose of investigating another, discussed earlier.
167. If the interrogation is being conducted by precinct detectives, they first go
over outstanding similar offenses within the precinct. Particular attention is apt
to be given to other cases with a modus operandi similar to that for which the
person was apprehended. If interrogation on these offenses is fruitful or if the
person is known to have been operating elsewhere in the city, the precinct detec-
tives may take the suspect to other precincts and review their outstanding cases.
In one such case in Detroit the detective took the arrestee to a neighboring pre-
cinct and obtained from the detective lieutenant on duty there all outstanding
breaking and entering cases for 1956, numbering approximately 300. Speaking to
the defendant, the detective said, "Now, remember, listen to these carefully. Re-
member, you're going to tell me whether any of these jobs are yours or the jobs
of any of the other boys in your group." The detective then proceeded to read off
the names of the premises that were broken into, the street address and then
read the officer's report describing the items that were taken. In going through
this file, the detective read only those reports which were for premises in the
general area in which these fellows operated.
After the precinct has firmed up the case for which the arrest was made, they
also might send him to a specialized bureau for interrogation concerning similar
offenses. For example, individuals arrested for auto theft are transferred to the
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the interrogating officer to proceed with a list of outstanding offenses
of the kind which the person has committed, asking the suspect about
them one by one. Such interrogations often prove fruitful. This is
particularly true in Detroit, where the interrogating detectives stress
the fact that any offenses admitted would be "free offenses" in the
sense that there would be no prosecution for them.0 8 Often a con-
siderable number of offenses are admitted and placed on a "cleanup
sheet"; in one case 127 felonies were admitted to.
Often the fact that an individual is known to have committed a par-
ticular offense makes him a suspect with regard to a more serious kind
of offense. For example, a person arrested for carrying a concealed
weapon is usually questioned concerning recent holdups. A similar
tactic is employed with regard to sex offenses when there is an out-
standing offense of a serious nature.69
This investigation of other offenses has proven very fruitful. Even
if no prosecution for these other offenses is contemplated, it does allow
the police to clear from their books a number of offenses and conse-
quently directs police resources to other outstanding crimes. But, be
this as it may, it is apparent that there must exist some meaningful
limitations upon the power of the police to investigate for this purpose.
The mere fact that a person is in custody and can be charged with one
offense hardly is a basis for granting the police carte blanche in in-
vestigating other offenses. The difficulty is that the law has seldom
indicated what limitations should apply in this situation.
Assuming the state of the law to be as noted earlier in Michigan and
Wisconsin, so that detention following legal arrest is proper when an
expeditious investigation is conducted for the purpose of obtaining
evidence sufficient to charge, the following situation may frequently
arise. The suspect has been arrested on reasonable grounds to believe
that he has committed offense A. Investigation uncovers evidence
sufficient to charge, which means he should now be charged and taken
auto recovery squad at headquarters for questioning about other auto thefts.
Similarly, persons arrested for breaking and entering or robbery are transferred
to the holdup bureau for questioning on other offenses.
168. The police appear to consider these additional offenses as free because the
law in Michigan does not allow the imposition of consecutive sentences. 2 O.A.G.
1955-56 No. 2381 (1956); In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105, 27 N.W. 882
(1886) ; In the Matter of the Petition of Bloom, 53 Mich. 597, 19 N.W. 200 (1884).
169. Thus, because of two unsolved sex slayings in Detroit, it was the policy
of the department that when anyone was arrested for a sex offense, he would
be booked for the offense and for investigation of murder, a copy of the arrest
report would be sent to the homicide bureau and the person would be questioned
by homicide detectives. Other departments in the area also made subjects available
for questioning after their arrests for sex offenses. Over a four-year period
approximately 600 persons in custody were questioned, and one of the slayings was
solved after questioning of a man arrested for indecent exposure.
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before a magistrate, where he might gain his release. However, a by-
product of the investigation may be that the police now have reason-
able grounds to believe (but not sufficient evidence to charge) that this
person has committed offense B. The central issue in such a situation
is: Since, absent the fact of arrest and detention for offense A, the
police would now be justified in arresting and detaining for investiga-
tion of offense B, are their rights any less because of the fact that
the investigation of offense A has reached the point where detention
for investigation of offense A is no longer proper?17°
Under the stricter Mallory rule, it would seem less likely that con-
tinued detention to investigate other offenses could be justified. Thus
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Mitchell 1 ' concluded that
when a confessed burglar was further detained while the police cleared
up 30 other housebreakings and recovered the property, "undoubtedly
his detention during this period was illegal. 17 2 As a result, District of
Columbia police have been cautioned not to jeopardize their case
by attempting to clear other offenses, 173 and this has been one of their
chief criticisms of the Mallory rule.17 4 However, assuming the Wis-
consin-Michigan approach is accepted (for the reasons stated earlier),
the better result would seem to be that detention for investigation of
the second offense is just as proper as was the earlier detention at
which evidence sufficient to charge on the first offense was obtained. As
one writer has put it, only if custody is viewed as inherently coercive
should a person be immune from inquiry merely because he has al-
ready been arrested for another offense.175
Of course, this is not to say that the police should have a similar
right to investigate other offenses when the original detention has not
provided "reasonable grounds to believe" with regard to one or more
170. A slightly different problem has arisen in England. There, the accused
is not to be interrogated after arrest concerning the offense of which he is accused.
However, it is not clear whether the police can interrogate concerning other
offenses. See Brownlie, Police Questioning, Custody and Caution, [1960] CRIM.
L. REv. (Eng.) 298.
171. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
172. Id. at 70. The court admitted the earlier confession of the burglary for
which arrest was made, refusing to apply any sort of ab initio doctrine.
173. The United States Attorney's office advised the police not to take chances
with a case like Mitchell-"you'd better be sure of the bird in hand and not go
after the bird in the bush." However, it was also pointed out: "Now, of course,
you recover property in many cases where you don't prosecute for that particular
offense. To the extent that you can continue to do that without jeopardizing your
main criminal case, you should do it." Hearings # 2, at 400.
174. See criticism of the chief of police, Hearings # 2, supra note 31, at 42,
and the deputy chief, Scott, The Mallory Decision and the Vanishing Rights of
Crime Victims, Police May-June, 1960 p. 61.
175. Brownlie, supra note 170.
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other outstanding offenses. In such a case, it is clear that further
detention cannot be justified on the same basis as above. Rather, if
any further detention is to be allowed in these cases, it must be con-
cluded that a person in custody who can be charged as to one offense
has fewer rights than he would otherwise have-that he can be de-
tained concerning offenses for which he could not even be arrested.
This would seem to be a difficult position for a court to take. If any
right of further detention were recognized in such a case, the only
possible justification would seem to be that since the person is already
in custody a brief extention of the custody time would not be a sub-
stantial interference with the person's freedom (that is to say, less
of an interference than an arrest, and thus justifiable on less evi-
dence). However, it would seem to follow from this that the added
detention would have to be most brief and that it could not be used
for actual interrogation but merely as an opportunity for the arrestee
to admit to other offenses. 1, 6
Assuming that the dividing line between proper and improper de-
tention to investigate other offenses is whether or not an arrest could
be made for them, the critical question in many cases will be when
grounds to charge for one offense equals reasonable grounds to believe
that the arrestee has committed one or more other offenses. For
example, can a person arrested and chargeable with a burglary-safe-
cracking be further questioned about a murder which occurred in the
midst of another attempted safecracking in a building next to that
in which the arrestee was previously employed ?117 Can he also be
questioned as to 15 outstanding safecrackings with a similar modus
operandi which occurred in the same general area ?178 Can a sex
offender be further questioned about an unsolved sex slaying?170 While
these questions will not always be easy to answer, at least the test is
identical to the one the police must employ every day in determining
whether they have adequate grounds for arrest.
Allowing further detention to investigate other offenses will cause
some problems even if limited as suggested above. For one thing, there
is a possibility that the detention for the second offense will be used to
justify what actually is an unreasonably long detention in order to
obtain evidence for charging of the first offense. Or, perhaps it will be
176. Thus, Judge Prettyman, concurring in Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d
677, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1958), stressed that the confessed safe-cracker was not inter-
rogated at length about other similar offenses, but rather was asked "just one
question about each of these crimes."
177. The majority of the court in Trilling v. United States supr note 176,
held such questioning improper under Mallory.
178. These are also the facts in Trilling, and the conclusion was that such
questioning was illegal under Mallory.
179. See note 169 supra.
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used, even when the suspect can be charged as to the first offense, to
obtain even more evidence on the first offense so as to insure convic-
tion. The first problem possibly could be obviated by requiring charg-
ing and arraignment on the first offense, with the magistrate remand-
ing the suspect to police custody if reasonable grounds exist as to
another offense.180 The second problem would perhaps cause more
trouble; it might not always be clear whether a statement concerning
the original offense during detention related to a second offense was
spontaneous or the result of questioning.
3. Custody to Investigate Other Offenders
When the arrestee is known to be one of a number of persons re-
sponsible for a particular offense, and some of the others are unknown,
or when the offender because of the nature of his conduct has had to
deal with other criminals, the initial appearance may be put off to
enable in-custody investigation for the purpose of attempting to learn
the identity of these other persons.
Thus a robber arrested while in the act of committing the robbery
may not be taken immediately before a magistrate because it is de-
sired to learn the identity and whereabouts of others who escaped
when the officer came upon the scene. Similarly, in other cases the
nature of the offense makes it clear that the offender has had to deal
with persons connected with an organized criminal operation. Nar-
cotics users are questioned about their source of supply, and persons
found with numbers slips or other gambling paraphernalia are inter-
rogated in an attempt to learn the identity of others in the syndicate.
Generally speaking, the detentions for this purpose are not for any
extended period; it usually is possible to convince the arrestee to name
his more fortunate colleagues or else it becomes apparent that he will
not provide the police with this information. Even after others are
named, arraignment may nonetheless be delayed until the police have
had an opportunity to arrest the others. This is done when the police
desire to avoid the possibility of the others being warned, or the
police desire to confront the others with the accusations of their
accomplices.
The legality of such detentions is unclear, even under the Wisconsin-
Michigan detention rules. It would appear to be improper under the
Mallory rule; at least the police have assumed so and have criticized
the rule on this basis. 8 Again, the gain from such detentions in terms
180. This would hardly appear to be a denial of the right to bail since the
suspect could be immediately arrested on the other offenses even if he were bailed.
181. A criticism of Mallory on this score was voiced by both the chief and
deputy chief of the District of Columbia at the same time they objected to not
being able to question on other offenses. See note 174 supra.
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of effective and efficient law enforcement is clear, but it does not neces-
sarily follow from this, that a person who can be charged and who
himself is not suspected of another offense should for this reason have
his custody continued. As in the case where the arrestee is merely
suspected of (but could not be arrested for) another offense, it might
be contended that some slight extension of the otherwise legal deten-
tion period is not a significant interference with the person's liberty
in view of the possible benefits to be derived.
However, perhaps a more meaningful way of approaching this
problem is by analogy to the other powers to detain persons who are
in a position to possibly identify criminal offenders. These other
powers are not placed in the police, but rather in the hands of the
courts.282 These provisions allow for compelled appearance and actual
testimony under oath of persons who might be able to give information
concerning offenses for which there is not sufficient evidence for
charging. 183
These statutes are relevant in that they are evidence of a recognition
by the legislature that the objective of identifying criminals sometimes
warrants the use of the power of the state against those who are likely
to be able to provide the necessary information. However, resort to
such proceedings every time an offender is arrested but his unknown
accomplices have escaped, or every time an offender is arrested who
clearly has had to deal with other offenders, would not only be cumber-
some but would present problems of granting immunity in exchange
for testimony. This being so, the basic question, unresolved by the law
in these jurisdictions at least, is whether the police, acting for the
same purpose, may properly extend an otherwise legal detention for
questioning not under oath.
D. DESIRABLE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST POLICE IMPROPRIETY
A number of different situations have been described in which the
police may take and continue custody of a suspect in order to obtain
evidence. Each of the situations requires separate analysis, and it
may well be that some of them will be considered proper while others
182. Thus, in Michigan the one-man grand jury provisions allow a judicial
officer, following the filing of a complaint or after application of the prosecutor,
to require a person to appear before him and testify where the judge has "probable
cause to suspect" that a crime has been committed and that the person can give
material evidence. MIciH. STAT. ANN. § 28.943 (1954). (Emphasis added.) Simi-
larly, in Wisconsin there may be a John Doe proceeding upon complaint that there
is "reason to believe" a crime has been committed, and again persons who might
provide information can be called to testify. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.025 (1958).
183. The investigations in Michigan and Wisconsin are to determine if there is
probable cause. People v. Birch, 329 Mich. 38, 44 N.W.2d 859 (1950); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 954.025 (1958).
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are prohibited. Even approved occasions for detention are subject to
abusive practices. Thus, in any criminal justice system which recog-
nizes some form of police detention, effective controls are necessary
to insure that detentions occur only in the proper circumstances and
that the investigations incident thereto are conducted fairly. Some of
the possible safeguards are explored in this section.
1. Prohibition of In-Custody Interrogation
It would seem to be a fair statement that much of the concern over
police detention has not been merely the fact that the freedom of an
individual has been interrupted while police investigation is pursued,
but rather that detention is frequently coupled with interrogation of
the suspect. Indeed, the emphasis of the court in Mallory upon the
confession problem suggests that what the court was really condemn-
ing was the use of in-custody interrogation to obtain the evidence
needed to charge. The Court condemned the use of "an interrogating
process at police headquarters" or "a process of inquiry that lends
itself . . . to eliciting damaging statements," and said they could not
"sanction this extended delay, resulting in confession." They added
that what brief delay was to be allowed "must not be of a nature to
give opportunity for the extraction of a confession."''1 4 Thus, it may
well be that the Mallory sanction would be applied not to all evidence
obtained during illegal detention, but only to statements from the
suspect. 18 5 The police governed by Mallory were not advised to refrain
from all in-custody investigation. But rather to avoid only a combina-
tion of questioning and less than brief detention.18 6
If the real concern is in-custody interrogation, then it would not be
completely illogical to allow detention but prohibit interrogation.87
There is not necessarily an inconsistency in the conclusion, for ex-
ample, that the arrest of three suspects and the interrogation of the
three to find the one guilty is improper, 8 8 but that the arrest of the
184. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).
185. See Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961), where the
defendant was identified in a lineup held during an illegal detention. The court
refused to decide whether evidence of the victim's identification in the lineup
could have been introduced, but said that in any event it was not reversible error
to permit the victim to make identification at the trial.
186. See the lectures given to District of Columbia police, reprinted in Hearings
# 2, at 400. However, it is unclear whether Mallory has even had this effect
upon the D.C. police, or whether the police use even greater pressures in hopes of
obtaining an early confession, with even untimely confessions sought because the
fruits thereof may further the police investigation.
187. The English system, in theory at least, demonstrates this well, as it is
precisely at the point where custody may be taken that the Judges' Rules con-
template that interrogation stop. See DFVLIN, op. cit. supra note 160, ch. 2, at 31.
188. These, it will be recalled, were the facts in Mallory.
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three in order to hold a lineup is proper. Implicit in such a system
would be recognition of the necessity of taking custody in some cases
though the person cannot as yet be charged, along with an attitude
that interrogation of a person in custody is either inherently coercive
or that actual coercion in such cases is so difficult to establish that the
only practical guarantee possible to persons in custody is to bar all
interrogation.
Both of these objections to in-custody questioning undoubtedly have
some validity, and some have taken the position that this justifies
prohibition of all such interrogation.1 9 However, the courts of all the
states are in agreement that custody does not render a suspect's con-
fession inadmissible, 19 and it does not appear likely that any change
in this view will occur. The importance to effective law enforcement
of in-custody interrogation has been stressed persistently in this
country. 91 As Justice Frankfurter recently observed:
Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection,
offenses frequently occur about which things cannot be made to
speak. And where there cannot be found innocent human wit-
nesses to such offenses, nothing remains-if police investigation
is not to be balked before it has fairly begun-but to seek out
possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions, witnesses that
is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense
precisely because they are suspected of implication in it.1°2
And it is not at all clear that the ten years under the McNabb-Mallory
rule has proved to the contrary.1 93
189. See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958). The authors are of the view that arrest, even on
probable cause, is not a proper vehicle for the investigation of crime.
190. For voluminous citations to cases in all states, see Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 590-94 n.38 (1961).
191. For many citations, see id at 579 n.17. In addition to the oft-stated view
that many cases would not be solved without interrogation, it may be that "our
system for the trial of criminal cases would be burdened to verge of collapse" if
confessions, resulting in guilty pleas, were not obtained in a great number of
cases. BARREr, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Clarge
50 CA.u. L. REv. 11, 45 (1962).
192. Id. at 571.
193. Some would contend that the experience under Mallory-really since
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)-demonstrates the contrary:
"The Techniques of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have proved that secret
prolonged interrogation is dispensible." Rothblatt and Rothblatt, supra note 163,
at 67. However, putting aside the better training and equipment of the F.B.I.,
it may well be that the law enforcement task in a large city is substantially
different from that faced by the F.B.I., and that separate consideration should
be given to the kinds of criminality with which the force must deal, as con-
trasted to the kinds handled by the other federal police agencies. See the
colloquies between Senator Carroll and witnesses Oliver Gasch (United States At-
torney for the District of Columbia), Robert Murray (Chief, Metropolitan Police
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2. Controls on Police Interrogation
If it is thought that absolute prohibition of in-custody interrogation
would unduly hamper law enforcement, then it may be that some
measure of added control over police questioning is feasible. Thus,
interrogation of persons in custody might be allowed only subsequent
to certain steps taken to insure the voluntary nature of any statement
given. It might be required, for example, that prior to interrogation
the police warn the suspect that he need not answer,"" or that the
suspect be given the opportunity to first consult with counsel."95 With
few exceptions, requirements of this kind have not been imposed upon
the police in this country.296
One objection which has been voiced against any change to a warn-
ing requirement is that it would interject an additional fact question
Dep't, D.C.), and Irving Ferman (Director, D.C. Chapter A.C.L.U.), in Hearings
#2. There has been some judicial recognition that the problems of a large city
might justify in-custody interrogation under circumstances which would not war-
rant its use elsewhere. E.g., Bailey v. Loomis, 228 Mich. 338, 200 N.W. 148 (1924).
194. Such is the requirement in Texas by statute. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art.
727 (1941). While the failure to warn the defendant will ordinarily bar the use
of an otherwise voluntary confession, White v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 77, 289
S.W.2d 279 (1956), this is not so where the truthfulness of the confession is in-
dependently established. Grimes v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 199, 225 S.W.2d 978
(1950).
195. "I would hold that any confession obtained by the police while the de-
fendant is under detention is inadmissible . . .unless the accused is . . . ac-
corded an opportunity to consult counsel." Such is the view expressed by Justice
Douglas in his concurring opinion in Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961).
196. As to warning, only Texas requires a warning. See Note 194 supra.
However, it is always a factor in determining the trustworthiness of a confession.
See cases cited note 132 supra. See S. 1893, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959), which
would have required warning of the suspect "that he is not required to make a
statement and that any statement made by him may be used against him," in lieu
of the Mallory rule.
As to counsel, in New York a confession from an accused without counsel has
been barred. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825 (1960). See earlier
discussion of the "suspect"-"accused" distinction. In Indiana, where the state
constitution has been interpreted as giving a right to counsel at the police station,
a confession most likely would be barred on this basis alone. Dearing v. State,
229 Ind. 131, 95 N.E.2d 832 (1951) ; Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386
(1949); Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920). Dicta can be found
in cases from other states suggesting the courts there might so hold. Rothblatt &
Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt ArTaign-
ment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24, 33 n.40 (1960).
In determining if a confession was obtained in violation of due process, it is
relevant to inquire whether the police refused the suspect's request for counsel,
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), or whether they denied retained
counsel access to his client, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). It is unclear at
what point the constitutional right to counsel really begins. See BEANEY, THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN CouRTs 127 (1955).
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into the criminal trial.9 T Whether this is an "evil" of sufficient pro-
portions to justify rejection of a warning requirement is debatable.
However, the observed practices do make it clear that the presence or
absence of a warning prior to the receiving of a statement would often
be uncertain. The defendant, of course, can always allege he was not
warned, and even the insertion of a warning statement in a signed
confession does not necessarily mean that the caution was admin-
istered before the confession was received or that it was given except
in a casual, joking or half-hearted manner.
As to requiring the suspect be given an opportunity to consult with
counsel, it is clear that the presence of an attorney can impair the
investigation in a number of ways. He probably will advise the sus-
pect to say nothing. 9 8 His visits to the suspect may require the police
to interrupt their questioning. He may by use of a writ of habeas
corpus or other means attempt to obtain his client's release, which
means at least an interruption of the interrogation process. Yet, the
suspect may need the services of counsel more at that stage of the case
than at any other time.299
If any trend at all is to be discerned in the state confession cases, it
would be increased concern over lack of warning and denial of counsel.
Although it is still true that confessions will rarely be invalidated on
either of these grounds alone, more and more courts have indicated
by dicta a possible willingness to strike down any statement received
when the suspect was not warned200 or when he was not allowed to
contact counsel. 20 1 If the courts really are willing to exclude confes-
sions in certain circumstances on a lesser showing than testimonial
trustworthiness, this would be a most significant development.
It might be well in passing to take note of a few other suggestions
which have been made for controlling police interrogation. One possi-
bility would be for the custody of the suspect to be put in the hands
of another agency, one not having the function of obtaining evidence.20 -"
197. Statement of Judge Holtzoff, in Hearings # 1, at 8.
198. To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, be-
cause, under our adversary system he deems that his sole duty is to protect
his client--guilty or innocent-and that in such a capacity he owes no duty
whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception of
criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.).
199. See Watts v. Indiana, id. at 59 (1949) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.)
and Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1958) (dissent).
200. E.g., People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960); State v.
Bronston, 7 Wis. 2d 627, 97 N.W.2d 504 (1959).
201. See Rothblatt and Rothblatt, supra note 196, at 33 n.40.
202. Thus, Glanville Williams has proposed:
It would, however be a step towards preventing possible abuses if the
accused were removed from the custody of the police. Only long familiarity
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Or, questioning might be allowed only in the presence of a disinter-
ested third party.2 0 3 Neither of these procedures is required by law
in this country.
3. Interrogation before the Magistrate
Another alternative which deserves to be mentioned is that of inter-
rogation not by the police but by a judicial officer. This might be said
to be a compromise position between the view that in-custody inter-
rogation is a profitable investigative technique and the view that the
coercive aspects of such interrogation are so difficult of proof to justify
denial of the right to interrogate while in police custody.
20 3
a
There is no evidence that such a practice exists anywhere in this
country today, though it does exist elsewhere. 20 4 Some commentators
causes us to accept without surprise the arrangement under which a suspect
is placed in the absolute power of those whose duty it is to obtain evidence
against him. Consider: we employ police to investigate crime, and expect
them to attain a measure of success in the apprehension and conviction of
criminals; at the same time, we allow those who are arrested to remain for a
time in the custody of the police themselves. . . . The conclusion is that
where a local jail is available, it should be made a rule that persons arrested
should be lodged forthwith in this jail rather than in a police cell. This
would mean that the physical safety of the accused person would be the
responsibility of a different set of officials from the police.
Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations, [1960] CRIM.
L. Rzv. (Eng.) 325, 345-46.
In some circumstances, something similar to Williams' proposal is practiced
in this country. For example, in the District of Columbia the prisoner after
arraignment is not remanded to the Metropolitan Police Department, but to the
U.S. Marshal or his deputy. See the interesting case of Goldsmith v. United States,
277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960), where the magistrate instead remanded to the
police. Also, in the states it is not unusual for a prisoner to be in the county jail,
while the police investigating the case are associated with some other level of
government. See, for example, the facts in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961).
203. The real problem [of police interrogation] is the need for protection
against police third degree methods, culminating in a coerced confession. The
value of having counsel present during the police interrogation lies not in his
being trained in the law, but in the protection against coercion afforded by
his mere presence.
Note, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 288 (1958). For expression of a similar view by
the Supreme Court, see Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Having an objective observer present during interrogation was proposed as a
possible alternative to Mallory in Statement of J. R. Scullen, in Hearings # 1,
at 177.
203a. Interestingly enough, adoption of such an alternative would be a partial
reversal of the earlier shift of investigative functions from the magistrate to the
police. DEvLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND, ch. 1 (1958). It has
been suggested that the present disparity between law and practice is in part due
to a failure of the courts to take account of the fact that the magistrate no longer
performs these functions. BARRETT, supra note 191, at 16-20.
204. This, of course, is the inquisitorial system, such as that found in France.
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have taken the position that magisterial interrogation would be not
only unrealistic215 but unconstitutional as well.201 Yet, just such a
system has been proposed by such persons as Dean Pound, Professor
Waite and Professor Warner, and, though it is seldom remembered,
such a recommendation followed the oft-quoted condemnation of the
third degree in The Wickersham Report.207
4. Remand to Police Custody by the Magistrate
Two practices described in full earlier deserve mention here, as they
are directly related to consideration of a possible remand system. One
is the initial appearance, as practiced in the observed jurisdictions. It
will be remembered that the appearance takes place after the detention
for investigation has been completed, that it does not involve a determi-
nation of the validity of the arrest and that it does not even include a
judicial testing of the evidence for charging, inasmuch as the warrant-
issuing function has been assumed by the prosecutor. The appearance
sometimes includes a warning to the suspect of his rights, con-
stitutes notice to him of the charge against him and, most important,
marks the point at which release on bail is made possible. The other
practice is the writ of habeas corpus hearing, a sort of defendant-
initiated appearance. While, strangely enough, defense counsel do not
usually inquire into the grounds for arrest at the hearing, the judge
will learn of the detention time which has already transpired, of the
progress which has been made on the investigation and of the sup-
posed basis for additional time for investigation. The judge often will
See Berg, Criminal Procedure: France, England, and the United States, 8 Dr,
PAuL L. REv. 256 (1959); Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in
France, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 692 (1940) ; Smith, Public Interest and the Interests of
the Accused in the Criminal Process-Reflections of a Scottish Lawyer, 32 TuL.
L. Rav. 349, 251-52 (1958).
205. Proposals to have judicially supervised interrogation seem unrealistic,
They ignore the likelihood of silence in response to official warnings. There
is no assurance that the judicial questioner will be skilled. The defendant's
silence or bungled questioning would not help the police to solve crimes....
Beaney, The Effective Assistance of Counsel, FUNDAMiENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL
PRoSECUTIONS 52-53 (1959).
206. "Such a procedure, being inquisitorial, would be in direct conflict with the
American accusatorial form of criminal procedure.... Indeed, it would be in
violation of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." Moreland,
Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. REv. 479, 487 (1955).
207. National Commission on Law Observance & Enforcement, "Lawless En-
forcement of the Law" (1931). Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or
Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 1014 (1934); Warner, How Can the
Third Degree be Eliminated, 1 BniL oP RIGHTs Rav. 24 (1940). Professor Waite
proposed to the original Advisory Committee on the federal criminal rules that the
commissioner before whom the accused was brought be entitled to interrogate the
accused. Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 489 (1958).
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set a time limit on added in-custody investigation, which means that
bail will be set only in those cases in which it is clear that custody of
the suspect is not required for the conclusion of the investigation.
Neither of these practices, it seems clear, provides a sufficient
modicum of protection for the suspect being detained for investigation.
The initial appearance occurs after the investigation is completed, and
the habeas corpus hearing must be prompted by the suspect himself in
order to obtain the limited inquiry which it provides. However, both
practices suggest another procedure might be feasible-immediate
appearance before a magistrate once custody is taken, with the magis-
trate having the power to remand the suspect to police custody when
it is established that there are grounds for in-custody investigation.
Some form of remand system has been suggested as a desirable
alternative to the Mallory rule.2 0 8 Courts operating under the rule
have assumed that only confessions prior to appearance and warning
are barred.219 And, there is some evidence that remand to police cus-
tody in the District of Columbia has been the response to the strict
requirements of Mallory.210 A form of remand to police custody is
expressly provided for in a few states2 11 and in other countries as well,
including England.212
Assuming detention by the police for investigative purposes is to be
allowed, a remand system may well provide the needed guarantees to
insure that these detentions occur only in the proper circumstances
and that the investigation proceed fairly. In favor of immediate ap-
pearance and remand, it may be said:
(1) It would allow for an immediate testing of the grounds for
arrest, and thus would prevent any "process of inquiry . . . to sup-
port the arrest" condemned in Mallory.2 13 The threat of illegal arrests
could be minimized because a judicial officer would, at the outset of the
detention, have to determine that sufficient evidence was at hand to
208. Comment, Piearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory
Miasma: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959).
209. The courts have not hesitated to uphold confessions after appearance and
warning. Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960); McNabb v.
United States, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 771 (1944).
210. In Goldsmith, supra note 209, the commissioner remanded the suspect for a
three-hour period; in Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the
"case was put over for one day" and the defendant returned to police custody;
in Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where the suspect was
returned to the police without the express consent of the magistrate, Judge
Bazelon, in a concurring opinion, took the position that "the magistrate may not
lawfully return him to the custody of the police." Id. at 694.
211. See note 20 supra.
212. See note 21 supra.
213. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
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justify the original taking of custody. Recalling the earlier discussion
of the distinction between the arrest and charging norms, this would
require the magistrate to test the available evidence not as a "legal
technician," but from the point of view of an officer considering all
probative evidence of guilt and the need to obtain custody promptly.
(2) It would allow for an immediate determination of whether
there are any grounds for further investigation. Thus, assuming a
system like that apparently contemplated in the observed jurisdictions,
the magistrate would want to insure that there was not sufficient
evidence for charging at hand and that the desired investigation was
not merely for purposes of obtaining additional evidence to increase
the probabilities of conviction. Other possible bases for further in-
vestigation might also be tested by the magistrate, such as the police
contention in some cases that further custody is needed if the police
are to clear other offenses of which the arrestee is suspected or if they
are to learn the identity of other offenders.
(3) It would allow a setting of time for investigation based upon
the unique facts of the particular case. The magistrate could set a
time at which the police were to return with the suspect (at which
time a further extension might be granted in exceptional cases). As
with the present practice in the habeas corpus hearing, it might be
said that the magistrate cannot foresee the exact course of the pending
investigation and thus cannot accurately determine at what time in the
future the detention is no longer warranted. This is true, yet determi-
nation of the probable needs based upon the facts of the case would
be far superior to the system now contemplated in some states in
which the same time limit is applicable to all cases.
(4) It would minimize the coercive nature of in-custody interroga-
tion. The magistrate could issue a warning to the suspect that he need
not respond to police questioning, and could apprise him of the actual
time his detention might continue. Unlike warning by the police
themselves, the caution by the magistrate might be more effective and
would not be so apt to create a side issue later of whether any warning
was actually administered. 214
(5) It conceivably could be coupled with a system whereby custody
upon remand was given to an agency not responsible for the investiga-
tion. As has been noted earlier, some evidence of this change in re-
sponsibility for custody is to be found in current practices. 215
Availability of magistrates has proven a problem on both the state
and federal levels.216 Perhaps it is necessary that there be enough
214. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
215. See note 202 supra.
216. Ginoza v. United States, 279 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Williams v. United
States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d
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magistrates so that they either sit around the clock or can be located
when needed. However, if the immediate appearance-remand system
is not practical for all situations, it might be desirable to at least pro-
vide this added protection in those cases in which it is thought to be
needed most. Perhaps it is only needed where the desire is to interro-
gate the suspect. If detention beyond the point at which the suspect
can be charged is recognized, perhaps it is at the point he becomes an
"accused" that these added safeguards are needed.
However, even with some such limitation, the principal objection
may still be that in many locales magistrates cannot be available
around the clock. Furthermore, even if the magistrates were given
express authority to remand, would this power soon be abdicated to
the prosecuting authorities, as has occurred already with respect to
the warrant-issuing power.218  If this is likely to happen, as appar-
ently it has in England, lb then it might be considered whether it
would not be better to assign this responsibility to the prosecutor in
the first instance.
No constitutional barriers appear to stand in the way of a remand
system. If custody is originally taken upon evidence sufficient to meet
the constitutional test of reasonableness, then it would appear that a
reasonable period of further detention for investigation is permissible.
If the present practice of the states in conducting the in-custody in-
vestigation prior to appearance does not violate the constitution,217
then the fact of prompt appearance before the investigation would not
seem to call for a contrary conclusion. The same can be said of a re-
mand system on the federal level.218
5. Police Release of Those Not to Be Charged
As noted in the earlier descriptive materials, it is not uncommon for
the police to release a person they have earlier taken into custody
because they now believe the evidence does not warrant carrying the
Cir. 1957); Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936);
Hicks v. Matthews, 153 Tex. 177, 266 S.W.2d 846 (1954); Beeland v. State, 149
Tex. Crim. 272, 193 S.W.2d 687 (1946).
216a. See note 10 supra,
216b. DEVLN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 95 (1958).
217. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), held the McNabb rule not
applicable to the states. And, in a long series of cases the Court has held that the
fourteenth amendment does not prohibit a standard for such detention and ex-
amination of a suspect as, under all the circumstances, is found not to be coercive.
E.g., Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ;
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941).
218. Comment, supra note 208, at 1035-37.
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case through the process any further .2 9 Release by the police may
come at one of a number of different stages subsequent to arrest. The
suspect may be released by the station officer immediately after ar-
rest,2 0 he may be released after a superficial investigation or he may
be released by the detectives after a more extensive investigation proc-
ess has either cleared the suspect or else provided no additional evi-
dence of guilt. Generally, release is a formalized function delegated
to supervisory officers.2 21 It is generally not the practice of the police
to obtain waivers of the right to sue for false arrest before release.
The practice of the police releasing suspects without taking them
before a magistrate suggests three distinct issues: (1) Is release of
suspects in custody without resort to prosecution proper? (2) If so, is
this function appropriately performed by the police? and (3) If im-
proper, should the police officer have to respond in damages?
As to the first question, an affirmative answer is suggested by the
earlier discussion. In a system in which arrests are properly made
upon a lesser probability of guilt than is required for charging, it is
apparent that there will frequently be occasion to release persons
without charging because investigation has disclosed no further evi-
dence of the guilt of the suspect. And, even if the same standard is
applied at arrest and charging, some persons will be released without
being charged because evidence exculpating them is uncovered after
their arrest but before they were charged.222
The question of whether the release decision is for the police is not
as easy to answer. Allowing the police to release without concurrence
of another agency certainly benefits the suspect in the usual case, as
further delay could be expected if the approval of the prosecutor or
219. Release by the court occurs only when the suspect has been brought into
court on a writ of habeas corpus. Release by the prosecutor occurs only when
the prosecutor disagrees with the conclusion reached by the police investigators
that there exists sufficient evidence to charge the suspect.
220. E.g., in Milwaukee the arresting officer is to take the suspect to the
nearest district station, where the commanding officer is to determine whether
the arrest is proper. Milwaukee Police Dep't, Rules and Regulations, rule 30, § 34
(1950). If he thinks there is not sufficient basis for arrest, he may release the
prisoner. Milwaukee Police Dep't, Rules and Regulations, rule 7, § 4 (1950).
221. In Detroit, the investigating officer may decide that release is proper, but
the reason for release must be noted on the arrest ticket and countersigned by this
officer's immediate superior and the officer in charge. Detroit Police Dep't, Revised
Police Manual, ch. 16, §§ 94, 98 (1955).
222. For instance, a person suspected of crime may be taken into custody by
an officer without a warrant, the arrest being entirely justifiable because of
the existence of probable cause to believe him guilty. Before he can be taken
before a magistrate it may happen that circumstances develop showing his
innocence. There can be no doubt that on all accounts he ought to be at
once discharged.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Hinsdell, 76 Kan. 74, 80, 90 Pac. 800, 802 (1907).
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court must be obtained. It is the exception rather than the rule for
prosecutors' offices or magistrates' courts to function around the
clock. Thus, as far as the rights of the suspect are concerned, it would
appear that release by the police can be characterized as improper only
when the suspect desires an opportunity to clear his name by appear-
ing before a magistrate.2 3
If release by the police is wrong in the ordinary case, it must be so
because it has an adverse effect upon the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system itself. For example, it could reasonably be
contended that since a decision to release is in effect a decision not to
charge, it is a decision which is properly exercised by the prosecutor,
not by the police. A decision to charge ordinarily requires concurrence
by the prosecutor, and it might be said that a decision not to charge is
also for the prosecutor, the reason being that the prosecutor is better
equipped to determine whether the essential evidence needed to justify
subjecting the suspect to the entire process is at hand. In short, police
release might be deemed improper because of a fear that some of the
guilty are thus escaping prosecution, the reason being that the prose-
cutor is better equipped to determine whether evidence essential to
prosecution is lacking223a or whether valid policy reasons exist for not
proceeding to prosecution. 223 b In short, police release might be deemed
223. Of course, if the person thus arrested will not accept his release and
demands to be taken before a magistrate, his wish should be respected, but
in the absence of any such demand, the simple act of a constable in thus re-
leasing a person against whom he finds no evidence of guilt would not of
itself suffice . . . as the basis of a claim for damages.
Mayer v. Vaughan, [1902] 11 Qu6. B.R. 340, 350, quoted in Hinsdell, supra note
222, at 79-80, 90 Pac. at 802.
223a. Sometimes this decision may be expressly recognized as for the police
to make. E.g., CALIF. PENAL CODE § 849(b) (Supp. 1961):
Any peace officer may release from custody instead of taking such person
before a magistrate, any person arrested without a warrant whenever: (1)
He is satisfied that there is no ground for making a criminal complaint
against the person arrested. Any record of such arrest shall include a
record of the release hereunder and thereafter shall not be deemed an arrest
but a detention only.
223b. Prosecutors generally exercise a broad range of discretion in deciding
which of the guilty should actually be subjected to prosecution. INBAU & SAWLE,
CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33-35 (1960); the series of articles by Baker and
DeLong, 23-26 J. CiM. L., C. & P.S. (1933-36); Munro, Functions of a
Prosecuting Officer, 11 U. DET. L. J. 1 (1927); Snyder, The District Attorney's
Hardest Task, 30 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 167 (1939); NOTE, 34 IND. L.J. 477
(1959); NOTE, 30 IND. L.J. 74 (1954); NOTE, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955);
No m, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955). Although less frequently recognized, a sub-
stantial degree of discretion is also assumed by the police in deciding which of
the guilty to arrest. LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law-Part
I, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 104;-Part II id. at 179. Some view the exercise of such
discretion by the police to be improper, Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
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improper because of a fear that some of the guilty who should be
proceeded against are thus escaping prosecution.
Denying the police the right to release suspects without taking them
before a magistrate might be justified on the ground that requiring
appearance in every case constitutes an effective control over police
practices.22 4 The point is that the cases in which it is later decided to
grant release are those where an illegal arrest in the first instance is
most likely. If the police are aware that in each and every case the
arrestee must be presented to a judicial officer, the added visibility
given their procedures by this device might influence a more careful
weighing of the evidence prior to arrest. However, perhaps an
adequate degree of visibility could be maintained if the police were
required to keep records and submit reports concerning cases where
release was granted.
The question of whether the police should be allowed to grant re-
lease, then, is not capable of easy solution. Some judgment is required
as to which of the conflicting policy reasons is of greater weight. Police
release may save individual arrestees from added inconvenience, but
yet may prevent the use of safeguards intended to avoid the release of
the guilty and the arrest of the innocent.
Finally, should a police officer be required to respond to damages to
the suspect for releasing him without taking him before a magistrate?
Tort recovery against a police officer has been made possible in some
states by the combined use of the trespass ab initio doctrine, whereby
any subsequent wrong makes the arrest illegal, and the statutory or
judicial requirement that the officer take the offender to a magis-
trate.2
25
Imposing liability for release under ordinary circumstances is diffi-
cult to justify. In the usual case the arrestee has been benefited, rather
than injured, by the release without the further delay of taking him
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). Although it might be argued that pre-arrest
discretion must as a practical matter be exercised by the police rather than prose-
cutor, LaFave, supra at 116-25, post-arrest selection apparently could be made
the sole responsibility of the prosecuting authority. Yet it is clear that in current
practice a substantial number of "no charge" decisions are made by the police.
224. The Cleveland practice bypasses the requirement that all persons taken
into custody be brought before a judicial officer; and while this may be a
kindness to the released suspects in some or many cases, it has the unde-
sirable feature of making it very difficult to determine what the police are
doing and thus handicaps control of police practices.
Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 NW. U.L. REV. 16, 25 (1957).
225. 1 HARPIR & JAMES, ToRs § 3.22 (1956); Bohlen & Shulman, Effect of
Subsequent Misconduct Upon a Lawful Arrest, 28 Com. L. REv. 841, 853-5
(1928).
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before a magistrate. 26 Compensation of the arrestee seems justified
only if his reputation has been damaged by being unable to obtain an
official refutation of the crime charged against him.
227
Of course, we have already noted that police release might be
thought improper for reasons relating to the effective operation of the
criminal process. However, to allow the obviously undamaged arrestee
to bring suit in these cases because of the officer's action contrary to
the public interest in proper administration seems questionable.2 28 The
use of tort law for such a purpose would appear warranted, if at all,
only after it has been determined that no other effective sanction is
available229
At most, the release in the usual case would appear to be some evi-
dence of the illegality of the original arrest.2 30 However, even here
caution is needed, as a subsequent lack of sufficient evidence to charge
does not per se make the arrest illegal on the basis that it was made
226. Indeed, it might be asked whether the magistrate can make any determi-
nation unless the case is formally brought before him-that is, either by the
complaint and warrant process or by writ of habeas corpus.
227. Thus, perhaps the best advice to the police is that found in the Pontiac,
Michigan manual:
If additional facts coming to the attention of the arrester dispel the sus-
picion of guilt under which an arrest has been made . . . the person arrested
should be released before taken before a magistrate, unless he himself
desires to be taken there to obtain official refutation of the crime charged
against him.
Pontiac Police Dep't, Training Manual, § XI D 1 (1954).
It has been questioned whether such damage is likely because of the police
release. "The release itself would seem to be a sufficient refutation of the charge
of criminality implied in the arrest .... But even if he is forcibly released, he
could probably still get either a hearing or an official refutation of the charge
against him." Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 225, at 854 nn.67 & 68. This
article contains an excellent analysis of the ab initio doctrine and the release prob-
lem. General liability because of release is also rejected by the Restatement, as it
is there asserted that the officer has a duty to release without first taking the per-
son to the magistrate unless the person so desires in order to remove the stigma
of the arrest. 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 134, comment f, and § 136, comment f
(1934).
228. See the excellent discussion of this point in Bohlen & Shulman, supra
note 225, at 843-46.
229. The problem is not unlike the issue of whether punitive damages have any
place in the law of torts. The policy of giving punitive damages has been con-
demned as undue compensation of the plaintiff, but has been defended as an
appropriate and effective method of discouraging improper conduct. PROSSER,
ToRTs 10-11 (2d ed. 1955).
230. The court in Hinsdell, supra note 222 at 81, 90 Pac. at 802, pointed out,
"The circumstances of [a prisoner's] discharge, however, may be of great im-
portance as a matter of evidence, in so far as they throw light upon whether
the detention was at any time legal-whether the arrest was made in good faith."
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on insufficient grounds. Because the legality of the arrest depends
upon the information at hand at the time of arrest,23 ' the fact that
exculpating evidence comes to light later can hardly make the arrest
illegal.23 2 If no exculpating evidence was later obtained, failure to
charge because of lack of evidence might be quite relevant if the arrest
and charging standards are identical. 233 But, a determination that
there is not sufficient evidence to charge can hardly be viewed as con-
clusive evidence that there was not sufficient evidence to justify arrest
where the two standards are different.
CONCLUSION
The complexities of the detention for investigation problem cannot
be overemphasized. Examination and evaluation of current practices
suggests that it is a mistake to even consider it as a single problem.
Rather, the present-day uses of detention for investigation are many,
and each of the many different practices presents distinct issues re-
quiring resolution from the law.
In each instance, the task is one of accomplishing a fair balance
between individual freedom and effective law enforcement:
Both unbounded liberty and its restriction place basic human
rights in jeopardy. Unbounded liberty jeopardizes the security of
life and property and, indeed, the security of our free society.
Were this not so, there-would be no need to place any restrictions
on liberty. Restricting liberty, on the other hand, jeopardizes the
basic human right to freedom in movement and conduct.
The problem, then, is to prescribe restrictions which will pro-
vide an acceptable degree of security without unduly infringing
upon individual freedom. . . .They must be so regulated that the
price paid in inconvenience and restraint has an equal compensat-
231. State v. Cox, 258 Wis. 162, 45 N.W.2d 100 (1950); Odinetz v. Budds, 315
Mich. 512, 24 N.W.2d 193 (1946).
232. An exception may be where "the means are at hand of either verifying or
dissipating those suspicions without risk .... " Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347,
355, 55 N.W. 999, 1002 (1893).
233. It would not seem that the reverse is true, that is, that later charging or
conviction establishes the arrest as lawful. Yet, occasionally a court will declare
that later conviction "is a conclusive determination that there was probable cause"
for arrest. See Hill v. Day, 168 Kan. 604, 215 P.2d 219 (1950); Doak v. Spring-
stead, 284 Mich. 459, 279 N.W. 898 (1938). A common statutory arrest provision
declares an officer can arrest a person for a felony "when such person has com-
mitted a felony," MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874(b) (1954); ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 21 (1930), and may be said to justify such a result. But, if such a
result is reached, it seems the only justification is a policy that a person in fact
guilty should not be able to recover in tort from the arresting officer. The only
case on this common provision found is People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d
528 (1955), which said that whatever the provision means, it does not justify a
search incident to an arrest made on less than reasonable grounds.
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ing value in the advantages of greater security. To keep the scales
of justice in balance, the advantages to a free society resulting
from a reasonable degree of security in one pan must hold in pre-
cise equilibrium the other containing the disadvantages that result
from restrictions.2 3
4
The difficulties in accomplishing this task should not deter its under-
taking. Those precise instances in which investigative detention has
social benefits outweighing the imposition upon the individual must be
identified and articulated. Moreover, the criminal administration
structure must be carefully scrutinized with a view toward creating
even more effective controls over the power granted to those acting
in the name of society. This much is owed both to the police agencies
charged with enforcement responsibilities and to those individuals
who find themselves the subject of official inquiry.
234. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Moderniza-
tion, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 395-96 (1960).
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